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CONTRACTUAL RULES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF BARGAINS
I
Introduction
In a perfect world, contract law would facilitate marketplace ex-
changes. This could be achieved by: (1) providing rules which guide
parties in forming prospective bargains;' (2) encouraging marketplace
exchanges through minimizing costs;2 (3) providing rules to fill gaps
left open by the parties;3 (4) optimally allocating resources;4 and (5)
creating rights and duties, the enforcement of which foster a sense of
security within the marketplace.5
Yet the world is not perfect, and rules of law may fail to operate
effectively or efficiently when the rigidity of law does not accommo-
date contextual nuances of specific situations.6 If rules fail to adjust to
1. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 389, 412 (1993) (suggesting that legal rules have two func-
tions: substantive-affecting transactional outcomes, and transformative-changing parties'
preferences); see also Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 805-06
(1941) (stating that contract rules are justified when they force parties to focus on certain
subjects or topics).
2. See Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests:
When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 531 n.127 (1993); see also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1150 (1981).
3. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 511-12 (1989);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 270-71
(1985); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Prin-
ciple, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1202 (1986) (citing Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligations, 69 VA. L. REV.
967, 971 (1983)).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 441-42 (2d ed. 1993); see
also Blake D. Morant, Contracts Limiting Liability: A Paradox With Tacit Solutions, 69
TUL. L. REV. 715, 761-71 (1995) [hereinafter Morant, Contracts Limiting Liability].
5. Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253,
312 (1991) (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 3 & 5 (1961)).
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1995) [here-
inafter Sunstein, Problems with Rules] (stating that "[o]ften rules will be too crude, since
they run up against intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be resolved.").
Professor Richard McAdams echoes this sentiment regarding this pejorative charac-
teristic of rules. Although he speaks in terms of "law" as opposed to "rules," the rationale
remains analogous. He explains his thesis within the context of racial discrimination as it
relates to individualized sacrifices on behalf of groups. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation
and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1995). McAdams notes that, notwithstanding its crudeness, the
law may nonetheless significantly influence individual perceptions and attitudes. See id. at
1081, stating that:
Law is more crude than an intellectual critique, yet it is inherently more public,
and can carry more weight. When Jim Crow laws mandated certain forms of
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the peculiarities of given situations, the very purpose for their creation
is defeated.7 Despite justifications based upon efficiency, perhaps the
legal community's enthusiasm for rules and their seeming ubiquitous
utility is misplaced. Rules are difficult to design for a range of circum-
stances given the lack of perfect information regarding the situations
to which a designated rule is to apply.8
While individual contract rules are based on well-founded objec-
tives,9 their collective relevance depends upon their collaborative abil-
ity to maintain the substance and integrity of the parties' bargain. The
oft-quoted phrase, "integrity of the bargain" encompasses the goal
that the parties truly attain their intended bargain. When contract law
fails to facilitate the parties' ultimate goals, and there is no regulatory
impediment barring enforcement,1" decision-makers, and perhaps
more importantly the parties themselves, should reexamine the law
and perhaps make adjustments to ensure its efficacy. Contract rules
and terms have little relevance and use if they fail to preserve the
substance of the parties' intended bargain."
The law, and in particular contract law and the contractual rules
and terms that they influence, permeate many phases of society.
12
segregation, whites confidently spoke of segregation as the natural order of
things; when the laws forbade segregation, discriminatory whites had a greater
difficulty believing their own ideology. Rationalizations can be fragile things;
sometimes they require that dissent be held to a minimum.
7. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, supra note 6, at 1021.
8. Id. at 957 (stating that "[i]n many circumstances . . . enthusiasm for rules seems
senseless .... Often general rules will be poorly suited to the new circumstances that will
be turned up by unanticipated developments; often rule makers cannot foresee the circum-
stances to which their rules will be applied."). Professor Sunstein notes a number of disad-
vantages of rules: their inherent rigidity can make them sweep too broadly, or fail to adjust
to, or ameliorate, unique situations; they may fail to adjust to fluctuating conditions; they
may be manipulated when applied to various situations to accommodate discretionary
agenda of decision-makers; and they can allow some wrongdoers to escape penalty. Id. at
992-95, 1021-22.
9. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
10. This presupposes that the parties' goals are not the product of transactions tainted
by illegality, immorality, duress, fraud, or unconscionability. See infra text accompanying
notes 86-96.
11. For more regarding the relevancy of contractual rules, see, e.g., Henry N. Butler &
Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of
Relational Contracting Theory, Transactional-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory,
32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1038-39 (1983) (stating that "the underlying principle of both the
classical and neoclassical [contract law] systems is that the function of a system of law is 'to
enhance the utilities created by choice-generated exchange but not necessarily those cre-
ated by other kinds of exchange,"' such as restructuring a contract, long after the offer and
acceptance to uphold the relationship of the contracting parties).
12. For a more detailed discussion of the interrelationship of law and other aspects of
society, see NIKLAs LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth King et al.
eds. & Martin Albrow trans., 1985) (stating that "law, indirectly or directly, affects all areas
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Law remains a fluid concept affecting many different disciplines.
Thus, legal principles are universal. The ability of legal rules to bring
about change or promote desired outcomes also contributes to the rel-
evancy of those rules.13
If maintaining the integrity of the parties' legitimate bargain is an
objective, then contract rules must be evaluated in terms of the effect
that they have on that intended bargain. This presupposes, at least
initially, that contract rules do have an effect, either intended or unin-
tended. The result, whether pejorative or favorable, must be viewed
in terms of the overall impact on the parties' bargain.
No resultant contractual terms more dramatically demonstrate
the significance of contract rules' effect on the ultimate integrity of the
parties' bargain than those which limit the liability arising from the
contract. These provisions, also known as "indemnity," hold "harm-
less," or "exculpatory" terms or agreements,'14 seek to limit the liabili-
of life and is therefore empirically difficult to isolate as a specific phenomenon"); see also
Thomas D. Barton, Expectations, Institutions, and Meanings, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1805 (1986)
(reviewing NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (1985)). Barton posits
that "[a]lthough most lawyers appreciate that prevailing social conditions strongly influ-
ence the development of law, formal studies of relationships between law and society share
little in focus and methodology. As a result, interdisciplinary efforts languish for lack of
coherence." Id.
13. Professor Sunstein also recognizes some of the advantages of legal rules. Given
their inherent convenience, rules: potentially reduce informational and political costs of
decision-making; check discretion and minimize bias and arbitrariness in decision-making,
thereby facilitating equality in judgment; encourage or, if warranted, limit decision-makers
to take action in certain cases; assist or notify citizens to modify or conform their conduct;
and maximizes accountability. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, supra note 6, at 972-77.
14. "Indemnity" has been defined as "the obligation resting on one party to make
good a loss or damage another party has incurred." Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-
Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1072 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Balcor Real Estate Holdings,
Inc. v. Walentas-Phoenix Corp., 73 F.3d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (defining "indemnity" as
recompense of an outlay to a third party, restitution, insurance, and general compensa-
tion); Vesta Ins. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 986 F.2d 981, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1983) (distinguish-
ing between indemnification and insurance; also stating that "indemnity" includes a
"contractual or equitable right under which the entire loss is shifted from a tortfeasor who
is only technically or passively at fault to another who is primarily or actively responsi-
ble.") (citation omitted); Brown v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 554 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1977)
(defining "indemnity" to mean "reimbursement, restitution, or compensation.") (quoting
Parker v. Puckett, 199 S.E.2d 343, 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)). "Hold harmless" agreements
have been defined as contractual arrangements "whereby one party assumes the liability
inherent in a situation, thereby relieving the other party of responsibility" or as "agree-
ment[s] or contract[s] in which one party agrees to hold the other without responsibility for
damage or other liability arising out of the transaction involved." Dresser Indus. v. Page
Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658
(5th ed. 1979)). See also Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. v. Wild Well Control, Inc., 889
F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing "hold harmless" agreements and stating that
"'hold harmless' means to assume all expenses incident to the defense of any claim and to
fully compensate an indemnitee for all loss or expense") (citation omitted); New York
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ties of one of the parties (the indemnitee) to the bargain by shifting
the risks of the transaction to the other party (the indemnitor). While
contract rules note the general enforceability of such provisions,15 de-
cision-makers who invoke these rules fail to recognize the overall im-
pact of indemnity clauses upon the ultimate integrity of the parties'
agreement. 16
The effect of contract rules, and resultant terms such as indemnity
agreements, is most pronounced when these rules are used to fashion
bargains within distinct industries or disciplines. The bargains struck
between writers, particularly fledgling writers, and publishers illus-
trate this problem.17
A writer's path to success, particularly a newcomer to the indus-
try, involves a combination of elation and confusion. Elation is easily
defined. The new writer is consumed with enthusiasm and anticipa-
tion about her expression which she seeks to share with the public.
Her euphoria continues even though she will likely assent to a
lengthy, form publication contract which is replete with comprehen-
sive terms. These terms include, inter alia, advances, assignments,
royalties, and rights of recapture. 8 Confusion often results, however,
from the writer's naivete, perceived powerlessness in the bargaining
Central R.R. v. General Motors Corp., 182 F. Supp. 273, 291 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (explaining
that "'hold harmless' means to assume all expenses incident to the defense of any claim
and to fully compensate an indemnitee for all loss or expense, undiminished by the cost of
defending a claim or litigation.").
Indemnity, hold harmless, and exculpatory agreements limit liability. In this article, I
will refer to all such agreements as either "contracts limiting liability" or "indemnity agree-
ments." Differences in nomenclature do not alter the analysis.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 102-124.
16. 1 use the indemnity clause as one example of a contractual term that may affect the
integrity of the bargain. This is not meant to suggest that indemnity provisions comprise
the only or primary terms which may have such an effect. Other terms, e.g., limitation on
assignments, modifications, and termination, may also influence the bargain. For the sake
of succinctness, my analysis focuses on the indemnity clause.
17. Like the selection of the indemnity clause, I use the writer and publisher contract
as an illustrative bargain that demonstrates my thesis regarding the effect of contract terms
on the parties goals and expectations. Of course, the analysis can be applied to contracts of
participants in other disciplines. The textual discussion of "writer" extends beyond those
who create prose, poetry, or other literary works; it also encompasses musicians, songwrit-
ers, computer software drafters, and other creators of original works.
18. For typical publication agreements within the entertainment industry, see DONALD
E. BIEDERMAN & HOWARD SIEGEL, MUSIC PUBLISHING AND SONGWRITING, in COUNSEL-
ING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1991, at 159 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G43864, 1991). See also
L. Friedman, Entertainment Industry Contracts Negotiating and Drafting Guide Form 41-1
(1986); Andrew 0. Shapiro, The Standard Author Contract: A Survey of Current Drafts-
manship, 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 135 (1970).
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processes and, perhaps, limited understanding of the bargain's
technicalities. 19
A troubling issue is the writer's agreement to indemnify the pub-
lisher for any legal liabilities resulting from the publication of her
work.20 This indemnity results from the predictable characteristics of
the bargaining processes between the writer and publisher. Often the
fledgling writer is unfazed by her assent to this term. Ramifications of
her assent often remain unknown until well after consummation of the
entire contractual arrangement. Despite the potential impact on the
writer and, eventually, the written product, this provision may have
19. The problems of fledgling writers can be assumed given their status as relatively
unknowledgeable and less powerful bargainers in the publishing industry. Notwithstand-
ing this obvious view, I must admit that the personal experiences of an acquaintance who is
a new and promising novelist strongly influenced my desire to write on this topic and also
underscored the veracity of the thesis presented. While I choose not to identify this indi-
vidual by name, I can state that the writer has recently published a novel which has been
adopted and distributed by a major publisher. This novel has received positive initial re-
views and has led my acquaintance to continue his writing career. I choose not to identify
this individual by name to prevent impairment of his bargaining position as he continues in
his career.
20. The indemnity provision in the publication contract generally comprises a standard
clause which typically includes the following:
Writer hereby indemnifies, saves and holds publisher, its assigns, licensees and
their directors, officers, shareholders, agents and employees harmless from any
and all liability, claims, demands, loss and damage (including reasonable counsel
fees and court costs) arising out of or connected with or resulting from any breach
of any of the warranties, representations or agreements made by the writer in this
agreement which results in an adverse judgment or settlement entered into the
writer's prior written consent. Notwithstanding the foregoing, such indemnity
shall also extend to the deductible under the publisher's errors and omissions
policy without regard to judgment as settlement. In the event that the writer
refuses to consent to a proposed settlement which the publisher considers reason-
able, participants shall assume the defense of the subject claim, action or proceed-
ing, at the writer's expense. Such indemnity shall also extend to reasonable
counsel fees and court costs incurred in connection with any claim, action or pro-
ceeding brought at the writer's written request. Publisher shall give the writer
prompt written notice of any claim, action or proceeding covered by said indem-
nity, and the notified parties shall have the right to participate by counsel of the
writer's choice at the writer's sole cost and expense. Pending the disposition of
any adverse claim or action, the publisher shall have the right to withhold pay-
ment of such portion of monies hereunder as shall be reasonably related to the
amount of the claim and the estimated legal expenses; provided, that any amount
so withheld shall be released if (and to the extent that) legal action shall not have
been commenced with respect thereto in a court of competent jurisdiction within
one (1) year following such withholding; and provided, further, that publisher
shall not withhold monies otherwise due to the writer if the writer shall deliver to
the publisher an indemnity or surety bond, in form satisfactory to the publisher,
we shall cover the amount of the claim and estimated legal costs.
See also supra note 11.
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profound effects on both the writer and the publisher who presumes
he has successfully shifted any potential liabilities.21
The writer and publisher often believe that they have freely en-
tered into a mutually beneficial relationship. Their agreement, how-
ever, may be fraught with frustration for both parties because it
includes an extensive indemnity responsibility on the part of the
writer. The problems for the writer are clear. Her assent to the com-
prehensive indemnity agreement leads to her assumption of consider-
able risks associated with publication of her work. Any financial
liabilities which result from this publication, i.e., copyright infringe-
ment,22 and any other issues which may lead to litigation, are her ex-
clusive responsibility. Such an assumption of risk can be financially
significant.23
21. While I have no precise data with regard to the proliferation of instances wherein
fledgling writers have bargained with more experienced publishers, this factor can be rea-
sonably assumed given the reality of the bargaining situation. See supra note 19 and ac-
companying text. Discussions with practitioners who reviewed contracts between authors
and publishers indicate that this bargain situation is not unique. Furthermore, the Author's
Guild, Inc., an organization which provides information and guidance to writers, indicates
that it reviews indemnity and other provisions of potential contracts between authors and
publishers.
22. Congress has the express authority to "promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Commensurate with
this mandate, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) which
protects eight types of communicative expressions. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). The
Supreme Court, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, extended the definition of
"authorship," stating that "[ain author in that sense is 'he to whom anything owes its ori-
gin: originator; maker ....... 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). While the Copyright Act of 1976 is
relatively inclusive, it does not protect "mechanical or utilitarian aspects" of a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See also Aaron M. Broaddus, Elimi-
nating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 43 (1994/1995); Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of
Multimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 351 (1995); William S. Coats & David
H. Kramer, Not As Clean As They Wanna Be: Intermediate Copying in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 607 (1994); Jeff A. McDaniel, Selected Recent Develop-
ments in Copyright Law, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57 (1994).
23. See A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of
Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351, 363 n.32 (1993) ("Copyright litigation can be
expensive even in preliminary stages."); Daniel Ebenstein & Marya Lenn Yee, Copyright
Infringement Litigation and Fair Use, in How TO HANDLE BASIC COPYRIGHT AND TRADE-
MARK PROBLEMS, at 261 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3834, 1989) (stating that the costs of copyright litigation
are relatively high). See also, Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d
Cir. 1988) (six weeks of work on copyright infringement cost more than $900,000); Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (copyright infringe-
ment case cost $166,000); Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (motion for
dismissal cost $47,000); Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (motion
for summary judgment cost $17,200); Hulex Music v. Santy, 698 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.H.
1987) (motion for summary judgment-cost equaled $10,600).
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Unbeknownst to the publisher and perhaps the writer, there re-
main residual problems associated with the inclusion of a broad in-
demnity provision. Certainly the publisher seeks a long-standing
relationship with a gifted writer whose additional works will garner
popular appeal and, thereby, generate substantial revenue. The
writer's assumption of extensive liability associated with the bargain
may effect her creativity,24 the quality of her future compositions and,
perhaps, her financial motivation to write additional works.
Irrespective of which party is in the best position to assume such
liability, central to the parties' bargain is the creativity factor-that
over time, the writer will continue to produce popular works which
are innovative, widely disseminated, and income-producing. Broad
and oppressive indemnity clauses in a new writer's contract manifest
two distinct, yet related pitfalls. First, the provision may be superflu-
ous because the publisher will likely be involved in any legal action
pursued by third parties claiming that the writer's work has damaged
them." Second, and perhaps most significantly, a broad indemnity
clause may ultimately stymie the very product, i.e., future productiv-
ity, which both parties seek to cultivate.
When the influences of legal rules and contractual terms which
they necessitate, such as indemnity provisions, unnecessarily frustrate
the parties' goals, i.e., the integrity of their bargain, decision-makers
should adjust these rules or, at the very least, the parties should alter
the terms of their prospective agreements. The viability and, perhaps,
suitability of rules should correlate with their circumstantial utility.
This requires the adoption of a more case-by-case approach to the
applicability of certain rules such as those related to indemnity agree-
ments.2 6 The task of preserving the parties' intent becomes more criti-
24. My assumption that the indemnity provision may "chill" the author's creativity for
future works may be subject to challenge. From an objective basis, however, the fledgling
writer who reads and understands the breadth of the provision would likely take to heart
the responsibilities which flow therefrom. Indeed, the author who inspired this article indi-
cated that the breadth of his publication contract, with particular attention paid to the
indemnity provision, remained in his consciousness as he contemplated his second novel.
See supra note 19. He successfully completed his next work; yet, uppermost in his mind
during its creation were his obligations under his publication agreement. While this phe-
nomenon did not deter him from creating additional works, it impacted the free flow of
ideas which normally would occur during the creative process.
25. See generally McGinniss v. Employers Reins. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1263, 1269
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (demonstrating the publisher's potential liability because the author's lia-
bility in a libel suit involving his book was covered by the publisher's insurer).
26. See Sunstein, Problems with Rules, supra note 6, at 958 (advocating a casuistic
approach to decision-making and stating that the disadvantages of rules and rule-bound
justice are often insufficiently appreciated. "In the casuistic enterprise, judgments are
1996]
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cal when contract rules are used to fashion bargains within distinct
disciplines such as the publishing industry.
I do not advocate a retreat from the use of contractual rules-this
would breed uncertainty and inefficiency within the market.z7 Deci-
sion-makers and bargainers should, however, examine the utility of
these rules in light of the parties' overall goals and expectations. The
"adjustment" of contract rules and the parties' agreement is consistent
with focusing upon the parties' motivation to bargain. It also reflects
the reality of the parties' consent, a linchpin concept in contract law.
This article posits that all involved parties should recognize the
counter-effectiveness of certain contractual terms such as indemnity
provisions in their contracts. Courts and parties should maintain this
skepticism irrespective of the parties' motives, i.e., risk aversion,
which prompt the incorporation of these clauses. If indemnity clauses
frustrate a goal of the parties, and that goal was the primary stimulus
for the transaction, consideration must be given to eliminating the
clause in its entirety at the extreme, or modifying it at the very least.
Adjusting an indemnity clause may facilitate the parties' ultimate
goals which initiated their bargain. This choice may also eliminate the
need for a decision-maker to adjudicate a breach of the indemnity or
other term of the contract. Eliminating intrusion by the decision-
maker should reduce the costs of policing the bargain.
For example, writers and publishers (and similar bargainers in
other disciplines) should seriously reconsider including in a contract
oppressive indemnity provisions allocating liability to the writer. Re-
gardless of traditional models which impose liability upon the party in
the best position to guard against such liabilities, indemnity provisions
should maintain the integrity of the true focus of the parties' bargain:
creativity and prolificacy z8 Ultimately, the bargaining process and its
resulting contractual terms must be scrutinized not only to prevent
based not on a preexisting rule, but on comparisons between the case at hand and other
cases, especially those that are unambiguously within a generally accepted norm.").
27. My position here relates to that of Professor Sunstein, who criticizes strict adher-
ence to, or dependence upon, rules. He notes that a compromise between rule-dominance
and rulelessness may be the promotion of "privately adaptable" rules which "allow private
adjustment, harness private ordering, and reduce the informational costs imposed on gov-
ernment." Such rules may further certain "regulatory goals" through the identification of
entitlement in lieu of designation of outcomes. Id. at 1023.
28. While I use a typical indemnity or hold harmless provision contained in writers'
contracts as a term affecting the substance of the writing subsequently produced, this does
not imply that this is the only provision that could affect the outcome of the writer's work.
Indeed, there are other provisions that could similarly affect the product produced by the
artist. Such clauses include royalty provisions, assignment provisions, publication in other
forms, distribution rights, and copyrights. I single out the contract limiting liability clause
as one significant provision that could likely affect the writer's product.
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unfairness to the writer, but also to maintain the integrity of the par-
ties' bargain, the goal of which is to produce fresh and original works
for future distribution. To preserve this goal, the bargaining process
must be less formalistic. It must also exhibit a certain elasticity in
scrutinizing contemplated contractual terms such as indemnity
clauses. As a matter of policy within contract law, this scrutiny is cru-
cial to maintaining motivational goals, expectations, and creativity.29
Part II of this article begins with a model of a bargain between
writer and publisher and a typical controversy initiated by a third
party. This illustration provides an appropriate case reference to illus-
trate the contractual analysis which follows. Part III then examines
the traditional, theoretical paradigm governing contract law. This seg-
ment focuses upon three concepts which color parties' bargains: moti-
vation, consent, and paternalism. Although contract theory
emphasizes consent as a justification for enforcement, decision-mak-
ers and parties must also appreciate the initial motivations prompting
the parties to bargain. This evaluation explicates why publishers and
other bargainers include indemnity provisions in their agreements,
and why such inclusion may warrant special vigilance. This section
also elucidates the present policies relevant to indemnity provisions
and the potential need to protect certain bargainers, such as fledgling
writers, who may be exploited under such clauses.
Part III of the article also attempts to prove that including indem-
nity provisions in contracts between writers and publishers, as well as
other bargainers, may be unnecessary and counterproductive. While
the traditional contractual paradigm may theoretically justify the in-
29. A compelling point regarding credibility cited by Ellen Smith Pryor, who was also
heavily influenced by Susan Estrich's article on rape, influenced this work. Professor Es-
trich emphasized the importance of an author's subjective experiences within the subject
matter about which he or she writes. Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency,
and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L.
REV. 91, 94 n.11 (1993) (quoting Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (1986)
(stating that she "[could] not imagine anyone writing an article on prosecutorial discretion
without disclosing that he or she had been a prosecutor")); see also Blake D. Morant,
Contracts Limiting Liability: A Paradox with Tacit Solutions, 69 TUL. L. REV. 715, 719 n.15
(1995).
Given this observation by both Professors Pryor and Estrich, I deem it probative to
indicate my particular background which led me to write on this subject of the effects of
contract law and rules on the bargains within certain disciples such as the arts. Notwith-
standing the fact that I teach contracts, I have practiced the discipline for a number of
years as a private attorney. While I have not proffered any artistic pieces for publication, I
actively participate in the musical arts and have acquaintances who have written works for
publication within both the musical and literary fields. My own experiences, together with
those of my acquaintances, provide insight into how the bargaining process affects the ex-
pression made by these individuals. The combination of these experiences have influenced
me significantly.
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clusion of terms such as indemnity clauses, this neither ensures the
viability of the clause, nor guarantees the maintenance of the parties'
goals and expectations. As further substantiation that indemnity
clauses are unnecessary, the publishing contract is examined as a pos-
sible relational contract. If publishing contracts are relational, then
cumbersome indemnity clauses may be superfluous given the inherent
nature of the parties' bargain to avoid the very problems which in-
demnity clauses attempt to rectify. This analysis demonstrates that
oppressive indemnity provisions should be supplanted with alternative
mechanisms that can minimize the publisher's liability.
While some parties may be wary of the excision of the indemnity
provision from their agreement, Part IV suggests a way to preserve
the parties' contractual goals. The alternative modifies the typical, on-
erous indemnity provision by minimizing the risks associated with the
publisher's distribution of the writer's material. It also eliminates bar-
riers to creativity which the writer may face in executing such an omi-
nous agreement. Modification of the indemnity provision would
produce a more equitable agreement. Rethinking the inclusion of
such provisions in publishing contracts may ultimately ensure the
preservation of productive creativity and prolificacy.
II
An Examination of the Bargain Within the
Traditional, Contractual Paradigm
A model of a typical suit involving a writer and publisher may aid
in understanding the complications generated by the inclusion of an
indemnity provision. The typical publishing contract contains an in-
demnity clause which allots sweeping liability to the writer for any
third party actions based upon such causes of action as copyright in-
fringement, plagiarism, and libel.3"
Assume that W (the writer) authors a book entitled "Great In-
tentions" and P (the publisher) distributes the book in accordance
with its bargain with W. C, a third party, claims that "Great Inten-
tions" contains enough material similar to C's manuscript to constitute
copyright infringement. C may then institute a lawsuit against W, who
allegedly infringed on C's copyright, and also P, who distributed the
work. Assuming P did not contribute to the creation of the book, C
nonetheless includes P in the litigation since P is in a better position
than W to pay any judgments. Given the comprehensive indemnity
provision contained in their publication contract, P will seek to re-
30. See supra note 20; see also In re Stein and Day Inc., 81 B.R. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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cover from W on any and all judgments which C attains even though P
may maintain control of the strategic decisions related to the litigation
itself.31 W's ultimate pecuniary loss could be mitigated if P has pro-
cured insurance to cover such contingencies experienced jointly by P
and W.32
Bargaining transactions, such as those illustrated above, tend to
conform to a contractual paradigm which governs the validity of resul-
tant agreements. This paradigm contains concepts which work to-
gether to define the goals, expectations, and performance of the
parties. Three significant, interrelated concepts provide the justifica-
tion for the parties' agreement. They are: motivation, which encom-
passes the goals and prompt individuals to seek out certain parties and
ultimate bargains; consent, which comprises the parties' assent3 3 to the
31. Under the classic scenario, the publisher's contract would include an indemnifica-
tion agreement referencing both the writer's pecuniary liability for any judgments sus-
tained as a result of actions involving the writer's work, as well as the publisher's right to
decide exclusively the conduct of the litigation involving that work. See supra note 20; see
also D. Appleton & Co. v. Warbasse, 155 N.Y.S. 987 (1915) (finding that a publisher may
recover from a writer those damages resulting from suits involving the writer's work. Such
liability of the writer stems from the "hold harmless" covenant contained in the parties'
contract.).
32. See McGinniss v. Employers Reins. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), in
which the writer of a book sought indemnity against the publisher's insurer for legal fees
and costs incurred to defend an action based in libel. In McGinniss, Joe McGinniss wrote
FATAL VISION, a book depicting the circumstances surrounding the murder of Jeffrey Mac-
Donald's family at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on February 16, 1970. Prior to publication
of this work, McGinniss reached a consent and release agreement with Capt. MacDonald
granting McGinniss extensive rights to use information concerning MacDonald's story.
After publication of the book in 1983, Capt. MacDonald filed suit against McGinniss and
the publisher of FATAL VISION, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Id. at 1265. While not explicitly
stated, it is clear from the facts of this case that the publisher, Putnam's, provided for the
coverage of McGinniss under its insurance policy with Employers Reinsurance Corpora-
tion, who agreed to
pay on behalf of the insured such loss ... as the insured sustains by reason of
liability imposed by law or assumed under contract the damages because of injury
... arising out of: (a) libel or slander ... or (b) invasion or infringement of the
right of privacy... ; or (c) plagiarism, piracy or misappropriation of information
or ideas ....
Id. at 1265-66. The court opined that the insurer maintained an obligation to cover the
legal expenses incurred by the writer as a result of defending the libel suit of Capt. Mac-
Donald. Id. at 1270-71.
By subsuming McGinniss in its insurance coverage, Putnam's must have recognized
the futility of an onerous indemnity provision which would attempt, yet fail, to saddle Mc-
Ginniss with sole liability for such suits. Putnam's may have also sought to preserve a
relationship with McGinniss for possible future works.
33. The term "assent" is generally synonymous with the word "consent," which con-
notes a party's cognitive volition to enter into an agreement. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterili-
zation of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 806, 865 n.131 (1986) (illustrating that "assent" has been described as "knowledgeable
agreement"). Consent is defined as "willingness in fact for conduct to occur." RESTATE-
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ultimate bargain, their expectations, and an essential foundational ele-
ment in contract law;34 and paternalism, 35 which serves as the deci-
sion-maker's check on the parties' motivation and confirms the
validity of the parties' consent.36 As subsequently demonstrated in
this section, the writer and publisher's situation illuminates these con-
cepts in the contractual paradigm which appear in most bargains.
Substantiation of the paradigm's concepts should confirm the va-
lidity and, therefore, enforceability of the parties' agreement. This ex-
amination also aids in understanding the parties' need for the
inclusion of certain contractual terms such as indemnity provisions.
This segment of the article also will delineate the operative facets of
these concepts. An understanding of the workings of motivation, con-
sent, and paternalism within the bargaining context explicates the dy-
namics of the parties' exchange. It also provides a key to the
maintenance of the parties' goals and fulfillment of expectations.
A. Parties' "Motivation" to Form a Contract
Potential parties to an agreement contemplate and seek out trans-
actions to maximize personal gain. These bargainers may also want to
undertake the transaction to realize or further benefits to society.
Such motivation 37 fuels the parties' drive toward a prospective bargain
and ultimately contributes to the realization of their goals.
As a precursor to a bargain, individuals must be motivated to
enter into such a relationship. Strangely, few, if any, decision-makers
or scholars acknowledge the true significance of motivation in the for-
mation of bargains.38 Motivation has been considered an element in
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1979). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (4th
ed. 1968) (Consent is defined as "[a] concurrence of wills. [V]oluntarily yielding the will to
the proposition of another; acquiescence of compliance therewith.").
34. "Consent" or "assent" is a key concept in the establishment, and ultimate enforce-
ment, of a contractual arrangement. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103
YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994) (acknowledging that "[c]onsent is the master concept that de-
fines the law of contracts in the United States").
35. For a more comprehensive delineation of the concept of "paternalism," see infra
text accompanying notes 86-124.
36. The identification of motivation, consent, and paternalism is not meant to suggest
that they are the only concepts within the contractual paradigm. Other complex notions
such as efficiency, breach, and damages also play significant roles. This article, however,
will focus on motivation, consent, and paternalism given their particular applicability to,
and effect upon, publishing and other similar contracts which contain indemnity provisions.
37. "Motivation" generally refers to the incentive or motive to contract. WEBSTER'S II
NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 772 (1984). I adopt the term "motivation" as a
concept which comprises the driving force that compels the parties to seek out and ulti-
mately consummate bargains with other parties.
38. See Ronald K. Chen, Once More Into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion Revisited
After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 331, 379 (1991) ("[T]he
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claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment contracts. 39 In fact, motivation generally has a pejorative conno-
tation when the decision-maker must regulate the bargain under the
veil of unconscionability.4 ° Yet motivation should not be viewed myo-
pically. The concept represents a powerful, cognitive starting point
for parties contemplating the need for an agreement and seeking
others who will devise a bargain fostering their mutual goals. This
force within the contractual paradigm defines the parties' goals, which
become expectations once assent is reached. As will be demonstrated
subsequently, motivation may provide a key to the maintenance of the
parties' true bargain.
. As for W and P, their "motivation" to enter into a publication
agreement may encompass many goals. Both parties may seek the
socially utilitarian goal of increasing or disseminating artistic expres-
sion. The parties may also desire a long-term relationship marked by
the publication of the writer's future works. Inherent in the second
goal is the belief that the writer's future works will be creative, well-
received by the public, and original.4" An omnipresent, tacit, and,
perhaps, overriding motivation in the bargain between W and P is the
law generally does not deem itself competent to judge motivation, the ultimate extension
of state of mind, and thus avoids its definition altogether. Contract law of course purports
to avoid subjective state of mind altogether in determining contract formation, and particu-
larly eschews motivation."). See generally Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810,
814-15 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that, with regard to contract formation, the "[s]ecret hopes
and wishes [of the parties] count for nothing," because "[t]he status of a document as a
contract depends on what the parties express to each other and to the world, not what they
keep to themselves"); B. Morris Martin, Contracts, 45 MERCER L. REV. 109, 117 (1993)
(indicating that there is a "familiar principle of law that one's motive [to enter into a con-
tract] is irrelevant as long as his actions are legal").
39. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see
also Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 594 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994), affd, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995) (stating that an action in tort will not lie for bad faith
denial of an employment contract unless the party bringing the action can prove, inter alia,
that the motivation for entering the contract was a non-profit motivation, i.e., "to secure
peace of mind, security, [and] future protection"); Okun v. Morton, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220,
232-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 985 (Cal. Nov. 9, 1988) (agree-
ing with the court's holding in Wallis that in order for one of the parties to state a cause of
action for tortious beach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, one charac-
teristic that must be present in a contract is that "the motivation for entering the contract
must be a nonprofit motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, [and] future protec-
tion"); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1986).
40. See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled
Approach, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357 (1990); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
130 (1810) (indicating that the private beliefs and motivations of parties to a bargain may
be irrelevant to enforcement thereof). For more insight into the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility, see infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
41. The originality factor precipitates the inclusion of the indemnity agreement in the
parties' ultimate contract.
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desire to maximize the income from the writer's present and future
publications.42
1. Motivation and Freedom of Contract
The parties' motivation to seek and enter into an agreement is
premised upon the parties' freedom to strike legally enforceable bar-
gains.43 "Freedom of contract" is the right and commensurate power
of parties to fashion their own bargains." The notion of "freedom of
contract" has a long and historic basis.4 5 Strict adherence to this no-
tion of "freedom" to contract would require decision-makers to honor
parties' bargains and exercise restraint in any contemplated interfer-
42. See Part III of this article dealing with the parties' contemplation of the continua-
tion of their business relationship for the distribution of future works of the writer. See
also in this section the discussion regarding the "relational" nature of the writer's and pub-
lisher's agreement and how the parties' agreement, while expressly confined to publication
by the writer, may evidence a tacit goal to continue their relationship if the initial bargain
is mutually successful.
43. See Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921). The
concept of "freedom" comprises a significant underpinning of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and remains reflective of Jeffersonian democracy, thereby facilitating individual ac-
tion and minimizing governmental interference. Id. at 366. Professor Williston also argues
that philosophers have historically applied the concept of freedom to contract law. Id. at
367. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dorr, 411 F.2d 198, 200 (1969); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 201 (1911); William Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating that
an individual's right "to make a contract in relation to his business [is] a liberty of the
individual protected by the 14th Amendment").
44. See Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1179 (3d
Cir. 1979) (stating that "the essence" of contracts is the concept of "volition," which con-
notes a "free exercise of will by parties who are on a relatively equal economic footing and
who are brought together in the dynamic marketplace by their needs and desires"); see also
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Spe-
cial Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,
570 (1982) (indicating that "[f]reedom of contract is freedom of the party from the state as
well as freedom from imposition by one another"). Professor Kennedy states that the no-
tion of "freedom of contract" fits within the "domain of pre-existing property rights." Id.
at 568. Professor Kennedy also recognizes that the decision-maker's power to enforce the
freedom of contract embodies not only the power to enforce agreements but also to refuse
to enforce agreements. This "balance" of non-intervention and over-intervention, which
are freedoms, serves to justify the impositions of paternalistic motives regarding the refusal
to enforce certain agreements which are contrary to the interests of one of the bargainers.
Id. at 569-70.
45. "Freedom of Contract" became a rallying cry among philosophers and politicians
during the 18th and 19th centuries. See Williston, supra note 43, at 373-74. Until the early
20th Century, the Supreme Court recognized the freedom of contract as an element of Due
Process guaranteed under the 5th and 14th Amendments. See David P. Currie, THE CON-
STITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY: 1888-1986 at 7-50 (1990).
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ence with those bargains.46 Indeed, some scholars who adhere tightly
to the idea of "contractual freedom" opine that laws which "interfere
with private arrangements" should be invalidated.47 Regardless of
philosophical differences related to adherence to freedom of contract,
the concept may suffer from definitional ambiguities.48 Indeed, some
have noted that the concept of "freedom of contract" suffers from a
lack of clarity. 49
Present views of "the freedom of contract" recognize it may have
limitations. 5° A state or judicial entity may legitimately "co-opt" the
parties' right to contract if the bargain is found to negatively affect
society, or to contravene public policy.51 Consequently, improvident
agreements, such as contracts which limit the liability of one of the
46. The "formalistic norm" of the freedom of contract notion requires the enforce-
ment of the parties' contract "as is." MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962); see also Darby Dickerson, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability
in Commercial Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REV. 129, 138 (1988) (noting that courts should not,
absent legislation to the contrary, honor parties' freedom to contract, thereby allowing
exculpatory clauses); see Note, Efficiency and a Rule of "Free Contract": A Critique of Two
Models of Law and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978 (1984).
47. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and The Corpora-
tion, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 769 (1989) (noting how the contract clause can be applied to
changes in state corporate law); see generally Richard A. Epstein, Toward A Revitalization
of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984); Michael Conant, Antimonopoly
Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-ex-
amined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785 (1982); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1980).
48. "Freedom" or "liberty" may connote different meanings to various individuals.
See Williston, supra note 43, at 366, where Professor Williston states that "words acquire
curious connotations in the course of time."
49. Theorists note that "freedom of contract" is incoherent since the notion rests upon
the concept of voluntariness which, at the very least, is elastic. Such elasticity can relegate
freedom of contract to a notion promoting ambiguity without an appropriate remedy. See
Note, Efficiency and A Rule of "Free Contract", supra note 46. The freedom of contract
notion may also confuse parties in defining their actions within the bargaining context.
Consequently, while the parties may freely "enter into an agreement," their rights and
duties pursuant to that agreement may be dictated by circumstances or policies which are
independent of, and not necessarily considered by, the parties. See Williston, supra note
43, at 379.
50. Limitations on the freedom of contract may involve questions of degree, depend-
ing upon the time, place, and circumstances relevant to such limitations. See Williston,
supra note 43, at 379. Various jurisdictions may also reserve power under the contract
clause, to interfere with contracts if such action is deemed necessary to promote a public
interest. See also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 47, at 781 n.57-58.
51. Agreements which contravene social policies as articulated by legislators may be
found unenforceable even though common law dictates their enforcement. See Cathleen
M. Devlin, Comment, Indemnity and Exculpation: Circle of Confusion in the Courts, 33
EMORY L.J. 135, 135 n.1 (1984). Police powers, which includes the power to prohibit con-
tracts, are permissible to promote "safety, health, morals, and the general welfare of the
public." Williston, supra note 43, at 375-76. Decision-makers may limit the freedom of
contract if such limitations are not considered arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 378.
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bargainers, may face restriction despite the notion of "freedom of
contract.
52
2. Motivation Within the Bargain-The Indemnity Provision
The parties' motivation to enter into a bargain is often multi-fac-
eted. Individuals manifest a variety of goals affecting not only the de-
cision to enter into a bargain, but also the definition of the terms
therein. For example, a bargainer's motivation to include an indem-
nity provision may have its origin in the goal of minimizing risks asso-
ciated with the prospective bargain.
In the W and P situation, the parties have entered into a presum-
ably voluntary transaction. The associated risks that the writer's work
or future works may involve litigation regarding ownership or
piracy,53 have been shifted to the writer in the indemnity provision.
The publisher's motivation to include this term must encompass her
goal of avoiding liability for damages associated with the publication
of the writer's work.
The publisher's avoidance of risks associated with the dissemina-.
tion of the writer's works relates to the concept of risk aversion. To
some degree, most individuals have an aversion to risk,54 which par-
52. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 627-28 (1936)(Hughes, J., dissenting) ("We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations of
liberty of contract. While it is highly important to preserve that liberty from arbitrary and
capricious interference, it is also necessary to prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be
used to override all public interests and thus in the end destroy the very freedom of oppor-
tunity which it is designed to safeguard ... we have repeatedly said that liberty of contract
is a qualified and not an absolute right.").
Such limitations on the bargainer's "freedom" to contract may relate directly to the
decision-maker's view that, irrespective of this basic motivational freedom to enter into a
bargain, there may be overriding public policy concerns which militate against enforcement
of the agreement. Such concerns relate directly to the concept of paternalism which com-
prises one of the three concepts of contractual enforcement. See infra text accompanying
notes 86-124. This concept of paternalism becomes even more pronounced with regard to
an agreement wherein one party assumes the liability of another party incident to their
bargain. See infra text accompanying notes 99-124.
53. Lawsuits against writers, authors, or their distributors are relatively commonplace
in today's market. See, e.g., Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1995) (songwriter
sued for copyright infringement); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d
971 (2nd Cir. 1991) (songwriter sued for copyright infringement); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d
896 (7th Cir. 1984) (songwriter sued for copyright infringement); Penelope v. Brown, 792
F. Supp. 132 (D. Mass. 1992) (author of a writer's manual sued for copyright infringement
by another author).
54. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12, 57 (4th ed. 1992). Judge
Posner indicates that risk aversion is not a universal phenomenon. For example, many
individuals enjoy the risks associated with gambling. Id. at 12. He acknowledges, however,
that most people are risk averse, and for those individuals the loss of a portion of wealth
"will impose a loss that in utility terms exceeds the amount of money involved ...." Id. at
57.
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tially explains the prevalence of insurance within the marketplace.5 5
Regardless of the arguments debating which of the parties would be
the more appropriate risk bearer, 6 shifting risks from P to W is a
primary, motivational focal point regarding the indemnity clause in a
publication agreement. That provision's validity will then depend
upon the decision-maker's consideration of paternalistic concerns im-
bued in such agreements.5 7
An economist may view the publisher as risk averse if he requires
more compensation to bear a particular risk than that risk actually
costs when evaluated on an expectancy basis. Viewed in this manner,
the publisher's aversion to risk may be less certain. However, he is
likely to pay the fledgling writer less than he would to a more estab-
lished author; therefore, he receives "more compensation" to bear the
risk of disseminating her work. Of course, the concept of risk aver-
sion becomes speculative given the reality that the costs of dissemina-
tion are difficult to quantify with any appreciable degree of certainty.
Like other normative evaluations contained in efficiency theories,
however, the concept of risk aversion is difficult to particularize in all
bargaining situations. This dilemma remains ostensible even if one
considers the merit of indemnity provisions in transactions where the
parties have disparate bargaining positions. Risk analyses often fail to
account for systemic differences among parties of disparate wealth.5 s
55. Because insurance has become widely accepted in modern business transactions,
decision-makers have moved away from the traditional view that contracts which cover or
indemnify the negligence of the indemnity are per se unenforceable. See supra text accom-
panying notes 50-51.
56. The "appropriate risk bearer" embodies a variety of factors. Arguably, the "ap-
propriate risk bearer" should be the party who is in the best position, i.e., could more
afford, to obtain insurance. Hence, one may argue that the publisher is in the best position
to absorb the risk given his or her resources. Moreover, the publisher, as a sophisticated
bargainer, presumably has the superior resources available to ensure that the writer's
work(s) are original and do not impinge on the copyright of others. Ultimately, if litigation
ensues over the originality of the writer's work, the publisher undoubtedly would be in-
volved as a co-party in such a lawsuit. On the other hand, the writer, as the author, may be
in the best position to defend against this risk given the fact that the writer originated the
work. However, because both the writer and publisher have similar overall motivations
regarding their agreement to publish the work; the attributes of the publisher tend to be
more persuasive with regard to the party who is in the best position to guard against the
risk. For additional discussion regarding the writer's risk(s), see infra note 183.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 86-124.
58. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial" A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 68-69 (1982);
see also W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
101, 104-05 (i988) (demonstrating that the study of the determinative effect of risk aver-
sion in product liability cases fails to take into account the wealth of individual plaintiffs);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 539 (3d ed. 1986) (acknowledging that
greater dispersion of outcomes discourages litigation among risk averse plaintiffs but de-
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While risk aversion may partially explain the publisher's inclusion of
the indemnity provision in his agreement with the writer, it does not
serve as justification for its enforcement. Notwithstanding arguments
that the inclusion of this provision in the agreement may frustrate the
parties' overall goals,59 the factors inherent in the bargaining process
may prevent its enforcement.6 °
The motivational element of the paradigm represents an academ-
ically neglected, yet compelling, force which propels the parties to-
ward their ultimate bargain. Moreover, it defines the parties' goals
which ultimately forecast their expectations. Motivation, then, repre-
sents a preliminary element of the parties' bargain, which is subse-
quently influenced by the notion of consent.
B. The Concept of "Consent" Within the Bargaining Process
Bargained-for exchanges may be classified as "contracts" since
they appear to involve an exchange of promises.61 Consequently, a
dining to account for different risk aversion levels based on differences in wealth); KEN-
NETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY 252-55 (1986) (noting that as individuals become wealthier, their degree of
risk aversion diminishes); but see John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 279, 287 (1973) (opining that, in the case of a possible Pareto optimal settle-
ment in litigation, differences in wealth or utility functions do not affect the existence of a
set of potential litigation settlement amounts. Additionally, the actual settlement value
will depend upon the "relative bargaining skills of the parties"-thereby ignoring the im-
pact of relative risk aversion.).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
60. For a discussion of the paternalistic concerns which may impact the validity and
ultimate enforcement of the indemnity provision contained in the writer's and publisher's
contract, see infra text accompanying notes 86-124.
61. See also Metro Comm. Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Comm., Inc., 984 F.2d 739, 744
(6th Cir. 1993) (illustrating that the prerequisites for contract formation are offer, accept-
ance, and consideration); Tsiatsios v. Tsiatsios, 663 A.2d 1335, 1339 (N.H. 1995) (stating
that "[o]ffer, acceptance and consideration are essential to contract formation"); Serand
Corp. v. Owning The Realty, Inc., No. C-941010, 1995 WL 653846 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 1, 1995) (stating that elements of an effective contract are offer, acceptance, and con-
sideration); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (defines a contract as
"a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."). Although not applica-
ble to the transaction between W and P (since W and P's transaction does not involve the
sale of goods), the Uniform Commercial Code provides a probative definition of contract,
"the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act
and any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1-201 (11). For more detailed description
of the variety of definitions of the term "contract," see Orvill C. Snyder, Contract-Fact or
"Legal Hypothesis?" 21 Miss. L.J. 304 (1950); see also Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-De-
bate Over Default Rules In Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 235, 236 n.3
(1993) (acknowledging efficiency theory as a descriptive tool in contract law, and adopting
the Restatement's definition of contract as "[a] contract is not a certain sort of promise.
Rather, a contract is a promise 'for the breach of which the law provides a remedy."').
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primary purpose of contract law is to preserve the parties' bargain and
to serve as a tangible embodiment of their voluntary assent to the
contract's terms.62 A critical component in the success and enforce-
ability of publication transactions is the determination that the parties
have indeed assented to the bargain.63 The parties' consent or mani-
festation of assent' to a bargain is a compulsory, if not dispositive,
element of their agreement.65 Consent also crystallizes the parties'
expectations as related to their motivational goals.
The concepts of assent and voluntariness in the bargaining pro-
cess appear related. Consensual arrangements, such as the one en-
tered into by W and P, should be enforced if they result from truly
voluntary transactions between those parties. This phenomenon re-
flects, to a significant extent, the neoclassical theory of contract law,
which advocates adherence to traditional notions of contractual re-
quirements, yet acknowledges the need for flexibility to accommodate
impediments within the bargain process, e.g., capacity (or lack
thereof) or unconscionability. 66 Using rules relevant to contract law
62. See Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Braham, Strategic Considerations in Designing
Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253, 305 (1992) (noting that contracts
"perform the traditional legal role of enunciating the terms ... and helping to ensure
performance or to fashion a remedy in the absence of performance"); Robert A. Hillman,
An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 653 (1983)
(stating that "the very purpose of a contract is to ensure performance... ").
63. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.1 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that assent
"is implicit in the principle that contractual liability is consensual"); see also JOHN ED-
WARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 29 (3d ed. 1990) (acknowledging that "[a]
basic question of contract law is whether two or more parties arrived at an agreement, i.e.,
whether the parties have expressed their mutual assent concerning their future conduct.").64. For the purposes of this article the terms "consent" and "assent" comprise synony-
mous terms and therefore, share the same connotation.
65. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986).
66. See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283,
1285-89 (1990) (providing a detailed explanation of the neoclassical theory of contract
law); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 235-38 (1979) (noting not only the characteristics of neo-
classical theory, but also delineating the distinctions between neoclassical theory of con-
tract law, classical theory of contract law, and relational contracting); see also Daniel A.
Farber, Contracts and Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 303,319-22 (1983) (providing a
cogent explanation of the neoclassical model of contract theory, which, inter alia, supports
the enforcement of bargained promises.)
While not explored fully in this article, other theories, e.g., critical analysis and eco-
nomic analysis, may also be probative regarding the operation of contract law. See, e.g.,
id.; Feinman, supra; Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 829 (1983); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examina-
tion of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in
Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REv. 103 (1988); Michael J. Meurer, 52 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1 (1989).
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implicitly reflects the belief that the rules used will provide an en-
forcement mechanism for an allocation of risks and commensurately
protect the proposed bargain.67 The neoclassical theory of contract
law thus manifests the goal to support and, to a certain extent, facili-
tate voluntary and consensual transactions.68 The concept of consent
represents a corollary of the freedom of contract notion.69
Barnett opines that the copsent theory of contract not only pro-
vides a foundation of the "objective" approach to the determination
of contractual intent, but also constitutes a more effective theory to
substantiate contractual obligations. 70 He acknowledges the popular-
ity of other theories of contractual obligation, party-based theories,
e.g., will and reliance theories; standards-based theories, e.g., effi-
ciency and fairness; and process-based theories, e.g., bargained theory.
Each of these theories accurately depicts an aspect of the contractual
obligation. However, they contain fundamental weaknesses, i.e., defi-
nitional ambiguities and vague parameters such as "reasonableness"
or "public policy" standards. Consequently, he promotes the use of
the consent theory of contract, which not only takes into account an
objective approach to discerning contractual intent, but also manifests
a clear sense of enforceability that avoids the need to deal in vague
concepts.7
1
Barnett's consent theory represents a moralistic refinement of the
freedom of contract notion, strongly relating to the neoclassical theory
of contracts. 72 As a result, his depiction of the consent theory comple-
ments the evaluative process which decision-makers should imple-
ment in the review of all bargains, including those containing
indemnity provisions. This concept relates directly to bargains be-
67. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 66, at 1265 (noting that "bargained-for" promises
tend to maintain the "value-enhancing" exchanges between the parties. Professors Goetz
and Scott further state that "such promises are thus seen as fully enforceable under the
compensation rule in order to protect and encourage value-maximizing resource alloca-
tion." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76 cmt. b: "[B]argains are
widely believed to be beneficial to the community in the provision of opportunities for
freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which productive
energy and product are apportioned in the economy."); see also WILLIAM PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 442 (4th ed. 1971).
68. Consequently, the neoclassical theory of contract law provides an operational
framework for economic transactions in the marketplace. Feinman, The Significance of
Contract Theory, supra note 66, at 1288 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 86-87,
90-92, 128-,130 (noting that the concept of paternalism functions, at least in theory, to en-
sure that the transaction entered into by the parties was voluntary).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
70. Barnett, supra note 65, at 291-94, 297-09.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 61.
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tween writers and publishers such as W and P. Objective manifesta-
tions tend to make matters of consent presumptive within publication
agreements-a formalized contract with accompanying signatures
substantiate assent. Yet, given certain externalities, the genuineness
of that assent may be questionable.73
Although other theories provide justifications for the enforce-
ment of agreements,74 the consent theory comprises a watershed,
commencement point in the resolution of whether a bargained-for ex-
change should be enforced.75
In the transaction involving the writer and publisher, consent to
the bargain appears evident. Indeed, the presence of consent may
seem obvious. The publisher authors a detailed publication contract
which contains many complex terms including an indemnity provision.
The writer presumably reads and comprehends the agreement and
both parties sign the document. Their motivational goals, namely, dis-
tribution of an original work,. pecuniary gain, contribution to society,
and extension of the bargain for future works by the writer, transform
into expectations.
Voluntary transactions, like the one between the writer and pub-
lisher, often attempt to allocate a plethora of duties and liabilities.
Various legal principles may govern such allocations. Absent any
other superseding principles, the common law of torts comprises a pri-
mary mechanism dictating how duties and liabilities may be allo-
cated.76 Traditional tort law mandates compensation by tortfeasors
73. See infra notes 114-115, 118-121 (discussing unconscionability).
74. See supra note 66. For an excellent survey of the various theories, e.g., efficiency,
relational, and consent, which are relevant to the enforcement of contractual obligations,
see generally Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY L.J. 43 (1993) (providing a comprehensive and thorough review of the various
theories of contract as they relate to default rules).
.75. See FARNSWORTH. supra note 63; MURRAY, supra note 63. This, of course, does
not signify a rejection of "consideration" as a concept affecting enforceability of bargains.
See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACrS 185-87 (3d ed. 1987) (stating
that one of the fundamental precepts of contract law is that consideration is required for
the enforcement of an' enforceable contract as well as any subsequent modifications or
agreement); Susan L. Martin, Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 653, 665 (1986) ("Common law requires that there must be considera-
tion in order for a contract to be enforceable.").
Additionally, the black letter rule is that a contract may not be modified without con-
sideration. United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1121 (7th
Cir. 1990); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir.
1986).
76. See Jones III v. United Medical Recyclers, 825 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (W.D. Mich.
1993) (indicating that an individual consumer's tort remedy is derived either from a duty
imposed by law or from policy considerations which allocate risk to the manufacturer and
seller rather than the consumer); see generally WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
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who violate the rules of negligence. 77 Parties, such as the writer and
publisher, may attempt to alter traditional tort law allocation of duties
and liabilities through consummation of a contractual agreement
which redistributes these liabilities. Application of contract 78 princi-
ples enables the parties to juxtapose the common law tort allocations
of risks associated with their proposed transaction.
Compliance with these principles provides parties with the secur-
ity that their bargain will be enforced since breach will result in com-
pensatory damages.79 Melvin Eisenberg emphasizes that present
contract law focuses on what promises should be enforced, and to
what extent such promises should be enforced. The solution, if any, to
these questions is grounded in the paradigmatic bargain principle, that
"damages for unexcused breach of a bargain promise should invaria-
LAW OF TORTS 399-442 (4th ed. 1971); see also Troy McNemar, Publisher Liability for Tort
Arising from Advertisements: Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 39 U. KAN. L.
REV. 477 (1991) ("Citizens of the United States depend on the judicial system to compen-
sate them when they are injured by another's unreasonable conduct. The law of torts allo-
cates these losses to the party that is responsible for the injury."); Glenn G. Morris,
Business Associations, 50 LA. L. REV. 211, 215 (1989) (illustrating that duties are imposed
under tort law generally to avoid or at least properly allocate the economic loss of personal
injury).
77. The cause of action for negligence generally includes: a duty owed by the
tortfeasor to the victim to exercise a prescribed standard of care, a commensurate breach
of that duty, and a causal link between the breach of duty and the resultant injury. Gener-
ally, the claimant must prove all of these elements in order to recover under a negligence
cause of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); see also Merten v.
Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1982).
78. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a "contract" as "a promise or a set
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1979). The fundamental purpose of a contract is to preserve a party's bargain and to serve
as a tangible embodiment of the party's voluntary assent to the contract's terms. See
Steven R. Salbu & Richard Braham, Strategic Considerations in Designing Joint Venture
Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253, 305 (1992) (noting that contracts "perform the
traditional legal role of enunciating the terms ... and helping to ensure performance or to
fashion a remedy in the absence of performance"); Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the
Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 653 (1983) (stating that "the
very purpose of a contract is to ensure performance ....").
79. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of
Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1178 (1994) ("Under the principles of con-
tract law, the moment a contract is formed each party is subject to liability for expectation
damages for breach, even if the breach consists of repenting or recanting only hours or
even minutes after the contract was formed."); Howard Gensler, The Competitive Market
Model of Contracts, 99 CoM. L.J. 384, 391 (1994) ("In contract law, damages are awarded
for breach where performance of the contract is materially substandard, incomplete or
absent."); Miguel Deutch, Reliance Damages Stemming from Breach of Contract: Further
Reflections and the Israeli Experience, 99 CoM. L.J. 446, 451 (1994) ("The law of contract
compensates a plaintiff for damages resulting from the defendant's breach. It does not
compensate a plaintiff for damages resulting from his making a bad bargain.") (citation
omitted).
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bly be measured by the value that the promised performance would
have had to the plaintiff, regardless of the value for which the defend-
ant's promise was exchanged."80 Considerations of efficiency and fair-
ness relate directly to this principle idea. However, the bargain
principle comprises a difficult theory to implement in the real world
and has led to the rise of unconscionability as a policing mechanism in
the transactional process.8'
Implementation of contract principles can affect both the particu-
lar provisions and the bargain as a whole. Parties' attempts to alter
traditional tort law allocations of risk through contract law usually re-
sult in agreements of indemnity8 2 or exculpation. 83 Indemnity provi-
sions illustrate the neoclassical theory of contract law within modern
contractual transactions. In keeping with the realism imbued in neo-
classicism, these agreements can be subject to restriction if, for exam-
ple, they are considered unconscionable.84
80. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 788-99 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle].
81. Id. at 798-801; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-115, 118-120, 128 (dis-
cussing unconscionability as it relates to the enforcement of the parties' bargain).
82. Indemnity agreements, which constitute one type of contract limiting liability, gen-
erally provide for the shift of liability for loss from one individual who generally would be
held legally responsible for certain actions to another individual. See E. Eugene Davis,
Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517
(1952). See also Harold A. Meriam & John V. Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-feasors:
An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 845 (1950)
(The authors of this article not only recognize indemnification as a mechanism which shifts
loss from one responsible party to another, but also distinguish the shifting of risks and the
attribution of liability due to contribution among joint tortfeasors.).
83. While indemnity and exculpatory agreements both function to limit the liability of
a culpable party, these types of contracts maintain distinctive characteristics. Exculpatory
agreements serve to limit or preclude the recovery of damages ordinarily due a victim in a
tortuous action. On the other hand, indemnity agreements do not apply to the victim's
right to compensation. Indemnification merely comprises a mechanism which dictates
which party in a contractual arrangement will be liable for damages resulting from the
victim's injuries. See Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 382 (Cal. 1964)
(noting that the limitation of liability contained in the parties' agreement in this case com-
prises an indemnification agreement in lieu of exculpatory agreement.). See generally
Cathleen M. Devlin, Comment, Indemnity and Exculpation: Circle of Confusion in the
Courts, 33 EMORY L.J. 135 (1984) (indicating the enforceability of indemnity and exculpa-
tion agreements contained in real property leasehold contracts, and providing the distinc-
tions between indemnity agreements and exculpation agreements).
84. A significant amount of scholarship has been dedicated to the neoclassical theory
of contract law as it relates to the traditional, contractual paradigm. See Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107, 1111 (1984) (indicat-
ing that neoclassical contract theory should be elaborated in order to ensure that the
theory encompasses principles which are "intellectually coherent and sufficiently open-tex-
tured to encompass the complex and evolving realities of contracts as a social institution");
see generally Eisenberg, supra note 80; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Considera-
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One may surmise that parties like W and P in the hypothetical,
who comport with formalistic rules, of contract formation, have as-
sented to a bargain. Yet, if one questions the reality or authenticity of
that assent, the result is less conclusive. Consent does not operate in a
vacuum, wherein formalistic motives assume its validity. Indeed, true
and valid consent must be considered in conjunction with motivation
and paternalism.8 5
C. The Concept of Paternalism Within the Contractual Paradigm
1. A "Definition" of Paternalism
The third consideration which may dramatically affect the effi-
cacy of the parties' bargain is paternalism. While a precise definition
may be elusive, paternalism can be generally characterized as a legal
rule or action which thwarts certain acts that are perceived as deleteri-
ous to the welfare of actor(s) or third parties.86 To some extent, pater-
nalism dictates whether an agreement will be enforced, regardless of
the transaction's comportment with formalistic contract rules gov-
erning formation.
Paternalistic intervention demands that enforcement of otherwise
valid bargains relate directly to a decision-maker's concerns, usually
focusing on the authenticity of consent and the pejorative impact of
the parties' motivation once the bargain has been struck and per-
formed. An omnipresent consideration in the application of paternal-
istic principles are possible deleterious effects of the agreement on
third parties. This latter concern, which may be generally stated as the
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1982); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1979).
85. As I argued at the beginning of Part II, the contractual paradigm includes not only
consent, but also motivation and paternalism. While some may prioritize these concepts, it
must be recognized that none of them work to the exclusion of the others. Each must be
considered in the evaluation of the parties' bargain.
86. See Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 712
n.9 (1992) (providing sources which attempt to define paternalism); DONALD VAN-
DEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 12 (1986) ("A paternalistic act is one in which
one person A, interferes with another person, S, in order to promote S's own good.");
HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 116 (1986) (adopting a rather narrow definition
of paternalism in contract law and stating that paternalism appears in modern contract law
as a means of preventing strong parties from dominating weaker parties); Jonathan Simon,
Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
1363, 1372 (1995) ("Paternalism is often defined as an exercise of control over an individ-
ual that purports to be implemented in the interests of that individual, either overriding or
filling in for unreliable or nonexistent individual choices."); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 572 (1982) (defining paternal-
ism to include all government intervention that purports to replace the will of a party with
what the decision-maker thinks is better for the party).
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implementation of "public policy," not only serves as justification for
the use of paternalism, but also contributes to confusion and uneven-
ness associated with its application. 7
Paternalism functions as a device external to the parties' transac-
tion and, therefore, may not relate to the actual substance of the bar-
gain.8 The operation of paternalism becomes pronounced when the
parties' agreement contains certain terms, i.e., the indemnity agree-
ment contained in the writer's and publisher's contract, which the de-
cision-maker may find impinges upon the rights of either one of the
parties to the agreement (in this case the writer) or contravene some
matter of public policy. 9 While not a conspicuous element of the bar-
gainers' agreement, paternalism functions as a decision-maker's mech-
anism to authenticate consent and protect bargainers and third parties
from improvident bargains.90 The operation of paternalism must con-
sequently be viewed in relation to both the motivations 91 and ultimate
consent 92 of parties to their transaction. Moreover, this concept may
function to affect parties' agreement as a whole, or specific terms, i.e.
the indemnity provision, in particular.
While the universal design may be to protect a bargainer (or
other third parties) from the adverse consequences of her bargain, the
methods and rationale for doing so may vary. Nonetheless, Anthony
T. Kronman categorizes the reasons for certain paternalistic restric-
tions placed upon contracts. 93 These rationales include: economic effi-
ciency and distributive fairness, which reflect the decision-maker's
attempt to redistribute wealth in society;94 personal integrity, which
87. Duncan Kennedy provides a comprehensive examination of "paternalism" as it
relates to the regulation of the bargaining process. Paternalism, which manifests "empa-
thy" or "love," "involves compelling a decision [which generally is not in accord with the
original bargain] on the ground that it is in the beneficiary's best interest." Kennedy, supra
note 86, at 624-25 (1982). Consequently, the decision-maker alters the original bargain
entered into when paternalistic concerns dictate that the bargain is somewhat flawed. Id.
88. Any "distributive effects" of paternalistic intervention tend to operate as side ef-
fects rather than as reflections of the party's bargain. See id. at 624-25.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 101-103, 105-110, 117.
90. Paternalism also relates to the motivation of the parties, particularly in the case
where one of the parties seeks to take advantage of the other due to some superior knowl-
edge or bargaining position. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 86-87, 90.
93. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763
(1983) [hereinafter Kronman, Paternalism].
94. Id. at 766-74. Kronman's example of distributive justice is the decision-maker's
refusal to allow disclaimers of the warranty of habitability in landlord/tenant relationships.
The concept of unconscionability would also fit within the rubric of this justification; see
also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
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seeks to protect a party's self respect or confidence; 95 and judgment
and moral imagination, which reflect the unwillingness to enforce bar-
gains against those individuals who suffer some impairment of judg-
ment.96 While these rationales are not mutually exclusive, they
provide philosophical justification for paternalistic intervention. 97
In the case of the writer and publisher, rationales focusing on per-
sonal integrity and judgment seem irrelevant. 98 However, the concern
for distributive fairness or justice, particularly with regard to specific
terms within the agreement, may give rise to concerns based in pater-
nalism. The indemnity provision could, therefore, invoke some de-
gree of paternalistic intrusion by the decision-maker.
2. Paternalism and the Indemnity Provision
The decision-maker may either vitiate an entire bargain, or invali-
date certain terms within the bargain. Consequently, the basic agree-
ment, complete with the parties' primary goals and motivations, may
remain intact, notwithstanding the possible invalidation of one or
more terms contained in that agreement. This flexibility comports
comfortably with the function of contract rules. If rules serve to en-
courage transactions and provide security to bargainers,99 decision-
makers should attempt to preserve the essence of the parties' bargain,
despite the invalidation of one or more of the terms contained
95. Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 93, at 774-86. Professor Kronman notes that
this rationale seeks to preserve individual liberty and, therefore, prevent self-enslavement.
He provides as examples antenuptial agreements, which prohibit divorce, and waivers of
discharge in bankruptcy. Id. 776-85.
96. Id. at 786-97. This rationale relates to perceived defects in the bargainer's reason-
ing. Professor Kronman specifically notes the contracts of minors as an example of the
applicability of this rationale. Id. The contractual restrictions based upon incapacity not
only invoke the notion of paternalism, but also relate to the absence or authenticity of
consent since the incapacitated bargainer did not possess the requisite faculties for true
consent.
97. While Kronman's delineation of the rationales for paternalism are not exclusive, I
find his analysis both comprehensive and probative. There are, of course, other scholars
who have made compelling points regarding paternalism in contract law. See, e.g., Richard
Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60
U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 649 (1992); Peter Benson, Symposium: Corrective Justice and Formalism-The Basis
of Corrective Justice and Its Relation To Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992);
Ian R. MacNeil, Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships-
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 (1985); Arthur
Leff, Thomist Unconscionability, 4 CAN. Bus. L.J. 424 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
98. This presupposes, of course, that the writer and publisher's contract does not im-
pose "quasi-enslavement" on either party to the transaction, and that there are no capacity
issues which impaired the parties' judgment at the time of contract formation.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 5.
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therein. 10 Given this fluidity, it is beneficial within the confines of
this article to examine paternalism in light of its applicability to in-
demnity provisions.' 0 '
As a preliminary premise and general rule, indemnity provisions
are per se valid and enforceable. 02 This axiom may also connote the
validity of indemnity clauses contained in publishing contracts. 10 3
Such enforceability may be due to the indemnity provision's resem-
blance to insurance. 104 Despite this general rule of enforceability, the
validity of these clauses functions under a significant cloud because of
paternalistic concerns. 10 5 Their viability generally depends upon their
intrusion on factors relevant to public policy. 0 6 As will be delineated
100. This presumes, of course, that the parties' overall bargain does not conflict with
paternalistic notions such as illegality, capacity, etc.
101. This is not to suggest that paternalistic notions applicable to the overall agreement
either are inapplicable or have no merit. I merely suggest that an examination of paternal-
istic intervention as it applies to indemnity provisions provides a cogent overview of the
concept's applicability.
102. The prevailing, modern view upholds indemnity agreements exempting a party
from ordinary negligence in which no public interest is involved and no statute expressly
prohibits the provision. See Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, 225 Cal. Rptr. 757, 758
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986). As a rule, exculpatory contracts are valid so long as they do not
conflict with public policy or implicate a unique relationship between the parties which
militates against enforcement. See Lohman v. Morris, 497 N.E. 2d 143, 145 (I11. Ct. App.
1986); see also Devlin, supra note 51, at 139; Mutual Marine Office, Inc. v. Atwell, Vogel &
Sterling, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
103. See D. Appleton & Co. v. Warbasse. 92 Misc. 42 (N.Y. 1915); cf. Ainger v. Michi-
gan General Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (upholding seller's liability to buyer
of publishing company in light of the warranty and indemnity provision contained in the
parties' contract).
104. The concept of "insurance" represents a mechanism which permits parties to elimi-
nate or minimize their responsibility for risks resulting from perilous exposure or activity.
See ROBERT RIEGEL & JEROME MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27-28
(1966). Insurance provides for a pool of assets accumulated from premiums and other
possible resources recovered from individuals who faced similar exposures of liability. Id.
at 27. A simplistic explanation of insurance notes that the combination of risks borne by
similar parties tends to reduce the uncertainty experienced by individuals facing such risks.
Id. at 28. See also ROBERT MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 243,
11-14 (1952); Scott Conley & George Sayre, Rights of Indemnity as They Affect Liability
Insurance, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 214 (1961) (recognizing that indemnity agreements, as a mat-
ter of law, shift liability among parties as a matter of law). The authors further indicate
that indemnity agreements essentially and ultimately impact insurance carriers of the par-
ties. Id. at 226-28.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90; see also infra text accompanying notes
114-115, 118-120.
106. It is well-settled that contract provisions may be declared invalid when they are
contrary to public policy. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); see infra
text accompanying notes 109-117, 122-124. Public policy includes other aspects such as
public duty. See Tunki v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). It also in-
cludes violation of statutes. See Fleming James, Jr.; Statutory Standards and Negligence in
Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95 (1950) (noting a differing construction of statutory stan-
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below, public policy represents a complex and amorphous phenome-
non which incorporates the paternalistic rationales described by Pro-
fessor Kronman. °7
Restrictions placed upon contracts which limit liability rest on the
longstanding belief that agreements that contravene public policy are
invalid.1" 8 Considerations rooted in public policy generally focus on
two primary concerns: that bargaining power disparity among the par-
ties to the contract may result in an unfair allocation of liability,0 9 and
that allowing parties to contract away their liability may encourage
reckless or negligent conduct.1' 0 These considerations prompt deci-
sion-makers to view indemnity provisions critically."1
"Public policy," however, constitutes an elusive phrase which de-
fies precise definition." 12 Generally, it has been viewed as "the com-
dards related to negligence); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-86
(1965). However, many statutes limit the use of contracts limiting liability, i.e., indemnity
and exculpatory agreements.
107. See supra text accompanying note 93.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-121.'
109. Contract negotiations often present "a situation in which the parties have not
equal bargaining power; and one of them must either accept what is offered or be deprived
of the advantages of the relation." WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1751 (3d ed. 1972). See
also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfort, J., dis-
senting) ("the courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the
parties are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage" of the other); Fitzgerald v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. Super. 1970) ("Much depends upon
the positions of the contracting parties. If they do not stand on a footing of equality, so
that one is compelled to submit to a stipulation relieving the other from liability for future
negligence, the stipulation is invalid .. "). See infra text accompanying notes 114-115, 118-
121.
110. "A contract exempting a person from liability for future negligent acts is subject to
the objection that it tends to induce a want of care .... Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. Super. 1970).
111. While seemingly straightforward, the law involving indemnity is fraught with un-
certainty. See Morant, supra note 29, at 727-28. Such uncertainty stems from such factors
as the lack of knowledge or skill on the part of one of the bargainers, and the difficulty
associated with determining risks and the liabilities that flow therefrom. See Frank P.
Grad, Contractual Indemnification of Governmental Contractors, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 433, 521-22
(1991) (stating that the ABA has asserted that determinations of risks and insurability are
extremely difficult to make, and that decisions relating to indemnities involve great uncer-
tainty); see also James B. Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly
Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323 (1980).
112. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983) (noting that public policy must be ascertained by "reference to the laws and
legal precedents"); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233 (1892) (stating that the
standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable, since contracts which at one stage of
our civilization may seem to conflict with public interest, at more advanced stages are
treated as legal and binding); see also Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E.
505, 507 (Ohio 1916) (observing that a correct definition, both concise and comprehensive,
of the words "public policy" has not yet been formulated by the courts).
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munity common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, public
safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that general and well-settled
public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow men
.... "113 This amorphous definition can ultimately lead to confusion
and disparate results when applied by different decision-makers in dif-
ferent bargaining situations. Notwithstanding its nebulous definition,
the rubric of public policy often serves to limit many contracts seeking
to limit the liability of certain parties.114
Perhaps the most significant consideration in the decision-mak-
ers' evaluation of indemnity provisions is the evaluation of contractual
terms and their impact upon the perceived disadvantaged party to the
bargain. Commonly referred to as unconscionability, this paternalistic
concept is a prototypical representation of distributive justice as de-
picted by Professor Kronman. Specific patterns of conduct of the ad-
vantaged party remain intrinsic to the paternalistic concerns regarding
the indemnitor. Enforcement of indemnity provisions may be jeop-
ardized by the assumption that the indemnitee will take advantage of
her superior bargaining position not only in the negotiation of the
agreement, but also in the performance of same.1 15 The difficulty with
enforcement arises from the fact that the indemnitee, who has supe-
rior rights under the contract, may behave in an opportunistic fashion
regarding matters related to the agreement." 6
If the parties exhibit great disparity in bargaining power, public
policy may compel the decision-maker to relieve the weaker party of
113. Kinney, 115 N.E. at 507.
114. Public policy encompasses a plethora of concerns including unconscionability,
breach of public duty (which includes the protection of third parties), and illegality (viola-
tion of statutes). For a comprehensive examination of public policy as it relates to indem-
nity provisions, see Morant, Contracts Limiting Liability, supra note 29.
115. Eisenberg indicates that the concept of unconscionability justifies limitations
placed upon the bargain principle given the need to ensure "the quality of the bargain."
Consequently, the bargain principle, which on its face appears to be relatively simplistic in
design, becomes exceedingly complex and difficult to implement in reality. Limitations
placed upon the bargain principle by way of such mechanisms as unconscionability not
only complicate the decisions as to which bargains the decision-maker will enforce, but also
heightens the administrative costs of enforcing such agreements. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle, supra note 80, at 798-801.
116. See generally Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior And The Law of Contracts,
65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981) (denoting the problem of one party's conduct which is con-
trary to the other party's understanding of the agreement, notwithstanding that such con-
duct is not violative of the explicit terms of that agreement). For a more exhaustive
discussion of opportunism within the bargaining context, see Richard E. Speidel, Article 2
and the Relational Sales. Contracts, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 789 (1993); George M. Cohen,
The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941 (1992).
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her obligation of indemnity under the contract.1 17 Such disparity re-
lates directly to the concept of unconscionability." 8 While seemingly
simplistic in perception, the concept of unconscionability comprises an
elastic concept which may include other elements such as "oppres-
sion""' 9 and "unfair surprise. 120
Eisenberg provides a cogent description of the historical imple-
mentation of unconscionability. He first notes that unconscionability
was considered a bifurcated concept which includes "procedural" and
"substantive" unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability in-
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (noting that an agree-
ment is not void "merely because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the
weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved ele-
ments of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful
choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent to the unfair terms."); see also Tunkl v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1963) (holding that public policy may
invalidate a negligence disclaimer when "the party invoking exculpation possesses a deci-
sive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his
services").
118. "Unconscionability" has been defined as "an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party." Leasefirst v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Wisc. Ct.
App. 1992). Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court describes unconscionability as an
"overall and gross imbalance, one-sidedness or lop-sidedness that justifies a court's refusal
to enforce a contract as written." McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 776 (W.Va. 1984);
see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (indi-
cating that unconscionability is recognized to include "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party"). Furthermore, the doctrine is broken down into two compo-
nents: substantive and procedural. The McGinnis court identified substantive unconscio-
nability as "unfairness in the contract itself-overall imbalance, one-sidedness. laesio
enormis, and the evils of the resulting contract." Procedural unconscionability, the court
explained, "involves inequities and unfairness in the bargaining process." McGinnis. 312
S.E.2d at 777.
119. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts emphasizes the concept of oppression as
an integral part of the assessment of unconscionability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1979).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes the concept of unconscionability,
notwithstanding the Restatement's basis in the neoclassical theory of contract law. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§§ 1.8-1.11 n.135 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN E. MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 9 (3d ed.
1990); Symposium, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 631
(1982).
120. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977) (stating that "the basic test is whether ... the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract .... [T]he principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise.., and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power"); see also ROBERT E. SCoTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CON-
TRACT LAW AND THEORY 514-16 (2d ed. 1993) (providing a comprehensive bibliography of
materials related to the concept of unconscionability and other factors used to regulate the
bargaining process).
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cludes basic unfairness in the bargaining process itself. Substantive
unconscionability consists of unfairness in the bargaining "out-
come"-that is the actual terms of the agreement. The distinctions
between procedural and substantive unconscionability tend to assist in
the reconciliation of that doctrine with the bargain principle. Such
reconciliation also leads to consideration of "unfair surprise" which is
a linchpin consideration within the doctrine of unconscionability.
Subsequent thought on the subject has indicated that unconscionabil-
ity now encompasses not only consideration of unfair surprise but
also, in some cases, examination of the fairness of the terms contained
in the parties' agreements. 12'
Decision-makers may also nullify unambiguous indemnity provi-
sions contained in printed form contracts. 122 Commonly referred to as
"adhesion contracts,"' 23 these form agreements require one party to
acquiesce to pre-drafted terms, typically printed in small type, on a
form supplied by a sophisticated business entity. Under these circum-
stances, decision-makers invoke public policy and will shield the
weaker party from the consequences of her bargain. 24
Paternalism constitutes a significant, yet troublesome concept
within the contractual paradigm. While its significance results from its
check upon the concepts of motivation and consent, its pitfall may lie
in its implementation by decision-makers. Notwithstanding its amor-
phous nature, paternalism's principal deficiency may be its possible
inconsistency and lack of precision with regard to its application. In-
deed different bargaining situations with similar characteristics, for ex-
121. See Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle, supra note 80, at 752-53 (citing U.C.C. § 2-
302) (1977); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clothes, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 486-94 (1967).
122. See 6a CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1472, at 599 (1962).
123. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173 (1983); see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631-33 (1943). Professor Kessler
defines an adhesion contract, quite simply, as a "standardized mass contract." These con-
tracts, Kessler writes, are highly practical from a business perspective. He notes, however,
that
standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining power.
The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position
to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard con-
tract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the
same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary
to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often un-
derstood only in a vague way, if at all.
Id.
124. Kronman recognizes that bargains which result from the execution of an adhesion
contract can fuel the decision-maker's intervention to accomplish distributive justice. See
Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 93.
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ample, different bargainers who include indemnity provisions in their
agreements, may experience differing fates given the vagueness of pa-
ternalistic rationales such as distributive justice. As demonstrated in
Part III below, emphasis on paternalism and the reality of consent as
they relate to indemnity provisions may be misguided and indicates
that maintenance of the parties' basic bargain may require a shift in
focus to the primary motivational goals of parties.
III
The Bargain Analyzed-A Discovery of Means
Which Foster Goals and Expectations
The concepts of the contractual paradigm 12 5 confirm the legiti-
macy of bargained-for exchanges among parties. Yet, segments of the
paradigm, particularly paternalism, may alter the original bargain or
undermine the parties' motivational goals and expectations embodied
in their proposed agreement. 126 Details of the contract, fueled some-
times by overt opportunism or "negative motivation," may serve to
obscure the overall goal or "positive motivation." The different forms
of motivation which may underline various goals, and the clauses gen-
erated therefrom, transform the bargain into a complex paradox.
Ultimately, the more minor motivations of the parties, mostly
those which prompt the inclusion of an indemnity agreement into the
contract, may frustrate a tacit, yet primary goal to continue the rela-
tionship if the initial bargain proves successful. The key to the main-
tenance of these fundamental goals is the reexamination of particular
clauses, such as indemnity provisions, to ensure their need and utility.
A. The Problematic Contractual Paradigm
1. Paternalistic Check on the Inclusion of Indemnity Provisions
Motivational considerations, i.e., risk aversion, which give rise to
the inclusion of the indemnity provision do not, in and of themselves,
justify enforcement of the provision. Although the document on its
face may indicate voluntariness on the part of the indemnitor, deci-
sion-makers may scrutinize such agreements in order to verify such
volition. Certainly, the potential lack of choice on the part of the in-
demnitor 127 may vitiate the voluntary nature of the parties' agree-
125. See supra text accompanying note 36.
126. The altering nature of paternalism becomes particularly acute in its applicability to
indemnity provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 127-128.
127. In the situation involving the writer and publisher, the writer, as indemnitor, may
be considered to have fewer choices with regard to publishers since she is a novice author.
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ment. Decision-makers utilize paternalistic devices to ensure that
consent to, specifically, the indemnity provision to authenticate and
verify the consent of the indemnitor. Consequently, the decision-
maker will likely evaluate the parties' transaction to ensure that the
indemnitor's assent to the agreement was genuine. 128 The veracity of
the indemnitor's consent remains inexorably linked to the individual's
lack of choice with regard to the agreement. This lack of choice, also
associated with diminished bargaining power, is generally embodied in
the concept of unconscionability. 129 This factor indicates that the in-
demnitor may have been compelled to accept the terms imposed by
indemnitee. Such an imposition militates against the presumption
that the indemnitor voluntarily assented to the indemnitee agreement;
therefore, the decision-maker, if convinced that all factors manifest a
lack of assent, may refuse to enforce the indemnity provision.13°
In the situation involving the writer and publisher, initial inspec-
tion may reveal that the parties' bargaining positions are indeed dispa-
rate. The publisher is a sophisticated business entity with,
presumably, pronounced experience in the business of publication.
These characteristics contrast sharply to those of the writer who, pre-
sumably, is a neophyte in the publication business. Consequently, the
publisher would tend to have better access to information required to
be fully cognizant of the facts and circumstances critical to the bar-
128. Decision-makers typically will scrutinize an indemnity contract to determine
whether the indemnitor voluntarily assented to the contract's terms-i.e., whether the in-
demnitor exercised free choice. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal.
1981); see also A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (The court noted that a contractual indemnity provision may be unconscionable and,
therefore, void if the agreement involved elements of "oppression" or "unfair surprise."
The court defined "oppression" as circumstances demonstrating "the absence of meaning-
ful choice" by the indemnitor.). But see Boat & Motor Mart v. Sea Ray Boats, 825 F.2d
1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1987) (stressing that "the allocation of risks by superior bargaining
power is not unconscionable"). In his treatise on contract law, Professor Murray explained
the rationale behind the judicial skepticism of one-sided contract provisions: "One of the
fundamental concepts of contract law is the concept of assent .... The two basic questions
raised are: (1) Did the parties agree to any future action or inaction? (2) If they did agree,
what are the terms of their agreement (or, what is their circle of assent)?" JOHN E. MUR-
RAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 352 (2d ed. 1974); see also supra text accompanying
notes 114-115, 118-120, 128.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115, 118-120, 128.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115, 118-120, 128. When the decision-
maker acts out of paternalistic motives she initiates rule changes which seek to improve the
welfare of a party to the transaction and thereby encourage them to behave in "their own
real interest." Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 570 (1982). The decision-maker's application of unconscionability may
function more from a concern of a bargainer's naivete, than from a true lack of bargaining
"power." Id. at 634.
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gain. Likewise, the writer, as a newcomer, would have little informa-
tion or access thereto. As a result, the writer would not be able to
appreciate fully the impact of her assent to the agreement likely con-
taining an indemnity provision.
The concerns involving the potential unequal bargaining posi-
tions may precipitate negative motivation and overt opportunistic be-
havior on the publisher's part.' Yet, the publisher, as a sophisticated
bargainer, would recognize his obligation to deal with the writer in
good faith.' 32 Consequently, any perceived opportunistic behavior on
the publisher's part may be checked by the requirement that all such
agreements be scrutinized in accordance .with the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.' 33
Irrespective of the concept of good faith, the disparate bargaining
positions of the publisher and writer raise concerns regarding the
writer's true assent to the indemnity provision. Her weakened posi-
tion may encourage the decision-maker to employ a paternalistic
mechanism.134
Notwithstanding arguments regarding the lack of choice on the
part of the indemnitor,' 31 the decision-maker may scrutinize the in-
131. See supra text accompanying note 116.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.").
133. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17 (2d ed. 1990). Various scholars have
written extensively on the concept of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Eric G. Ander-
sen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 299 (1988); Steven J.
Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of A Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers,
69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of A Contract
Within Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981); Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness on the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); Robert
S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); see
also Nina G. Stillman, Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy, and Tort Claims, in
24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 313 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. H4-5219, 1995) (discussing the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context); Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too
Soon: Contract Risks From the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 483
(1994) (discussing the viability of the tort remedy of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing for a breach of contract).
134. Note that there may be a cogent argument regarding the "transactional incapacity"
suffered by the writer. But that concept in and of itself may not lead to the invalidation of
the indemnity provision. See supra text accompanying notes 117-120.
135. Lack of choice relates directly to the concept of consent and whether in fact the
indemnitor assented to the indemnity provision.
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demnity provision with regard to its actual substance.136 In a publish-
ing contract, if the decision-maker finds the indemnity provision to be
unduly burdensome or onerous on the writer, the academic assump-
tion would be that the decision-maker would not enforce the provi-
sion against the writer. Yet use of this potential paternalistic remedy
remains speculative given the fact that it would be difficult for the
decision-maker to find the provision onerous. First, indemnity provi-
sions contained in publishers' and writers' agreements tend to be rela-
tively standard with regard to publication contracts. 137 Moreover,
since any actionability under these agreements emanate directly from
the writer's work, and the probability of action relates directly to the
degree of originality of that work, the fact that the parties' agreement
places the majority of responsibility for liability on the writer appears
reasonable. Consequently, substantive unconscionability, i.e., that the
terms of the writer's and the publisher's indemnity clause are patently
unfair or oppressive, remains debatable and fails to provide a true
gauge as to whether the decision-maker would invalidate the provi-
sion based on those terms. 138
Likewise, the indemnity provision contained in the publisher's
and writer's agreement does not seemingly offend any public policy
considerations such as the encouragement of recklessness or the
breach of public duty.139 The decision-maker generally may feel com-
pelled not to enforce indemnity agreements wherein such action may
136. See supra notes 118, 120.
137. See supra note 20.
138. Perhaps the decision-maker recognizes the difficulties and inconsistencies which
are inherent in the application of paternalism. See Kennedy, supra note 130, at 633-34
(stating that paternalistic concerns remain somewhat incoherent, with interventions based
upon the protection of "incapacitated" minors to reasonably intelligent adults).
139. The situation between the writer and publisher contrasts sharply with those bar-
gainers whose agreement affects the health, safety, or welfare of the general public, i.e., an
indemnity or exculpatory agreement between a common carrier and some other equal bar-
gaining partner. See Northwest Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 351 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir.
1965) (noting that an indemnity agreement whereby the indemnitor will assume the liabil-
ity of damages caused by the negligence of the indemnitee, must not promote a breach of
public duty); see also United States v. Contract Management, 912 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir.
1990) (indicating "concern over the public policy ramifications of allowing the government
to shift the burden of its negligent acts to its economically weaker contractors" through
indemnification agreements); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 698 F.
Supp. 951, 971 (D.D.C. 1988) ("Broad indemnification is particularly disfavored where the
indemnitee's activities directly affect public safety."); Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1973) (recognizing that "in certain contexts an arrangement requiring
indemnification for the negligent acts of another might be invalid and unenforceable as
against public policy"); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542, 548 (10th Cir. 1966)
(illustrating that with regard to the "enforceability of so-called release-from-negligence
contracts whereby one possessed of superior bargaining power is enabled to contract
against liability for his own negligence .... [tjhe federal view is that they are contrary to
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induce reckless conduct on the part of the indemnitee. 14 ° The encour-
agement of recklessness does not appear to be a problem in transac-
tions such as those entered into by the publisher and writer. Indeed,
given that the provision may discourage authors or composers from
adopting the work of others, one may argue that the inclusion of the
indemnitee provision would prevent encroachment. 141
As a result, the fate of the indemnity provision contained in the
publisher's and writer's contract remains doubtful at best when
viewed solely in terms of the contractual paradigm. The decision-
maker may question the writer's assent to the agreement given the
disparate nature of her bargaining position as compared to that of the
publisher's. However, that alone appears to be the most significant
factor within the paternalism model to vitiate the agreement. In fact,
one may argue that the mere presence of an unequal bargaining posi-
tion alone would not be enough to invalidate the indemnity provi-
sion. In order for the decision-maker to invalidate the indemnity
provision, it appears that the actual substance of the agreement must
be unusually oppressive.143
The inescapable conclusion is that the imposition of the paternal-
istic mechanism, which may be unavoidable with regard to indemnity
provisions, may leave parties such as the writer and publisher with a
large degree of uncertainty relevant to the enforceability of that provi-
sion.144 Even if the writer's consent to the indemnity provision is sus-
pect, the use of paternalistic mechanisms to defeat the clause remains
specious. Moreover, the publisher may experience a great degree of
public policy, especially contracts affected with a public interest and involving the perform-
ance of a public duty").
140. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 127-28 (1987).
For qualifications of this thesis, see id. at 129-31, 134, 146-51. Some argue that the deter-
rence of conduct through the assignment of remedies under tort law, i.e., compensatory
damages, may not be effective and should be replaced., See generally STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 38-41 (1989).
141. Such discouragement results in the fear of pecuniary liability resulting from the
possible infringement of a copyright.
142. The marketplace remains replete with examples of agreements among individual
entities with disparate bargaining positions. The mere fact that their positions are different
does not necessarily mean that the agreements struck by those parties are per se invalid.
Consequently, one must evaluate the language of those agreements in order to determine
whether they should be enforced. In the case of the writer and publisher, one may argue
that the writer remains in an inferior bargaining position with regard to the publication
agreement. However, this omits the reality that authors or composers, even fledgling art-
ists such as the writer, often have agents who are experienced individuals within the publi-
cation business. If the writer has such an agent, such counsel may seriously jeopardize the
argument that her bargaining position is compromised.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 118-120.
144. See supra notes 106, 109-117, 122-124, 128-130.
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confusion and discomfort with the uncertain results imbued in the ap-
plication of paternalism.145 The confusion inherent in the application
of paternalism becomes even more disruptive given that the need for
the indemnity provision may be overstated. Consequently, parties
must rethink the need for this provision in an effort to maintain their
overall motivational goals of the publication contract.
The mechanisms of paternalism surface only after a malfunction
within one or more of the elements of the contractual paradigm, i.e.,
when the motivational goals of one or more of the parties have been
frustrated, where the consent of the parties at the time of formation
was either skewed or nonexistent, or the pejorative opportunism 146 of
one of the parties frustrated the goals and motivations of the other
party. The breakdown within the bargain may prompt one or more of
the parties to cease performance and perhaps seek some remedy from
the decision-maker. The decision-maker will then likely determine
whether or not the elements of paternalism apply to the breakdown of
this transaction.
Paternalism is no cure-all, however. The parties should not rely
on paternalism to rectify a breakdown within the bargain and to pro-
tect their goals and expectations. Paternalism, which is generally im-
plemented only by the decision-maker, can be costly, time consuming,
and therefore, inefficient.' 47 The invocation of paternalism requires
the parties to expend considerable resources. Moreover, while the ru-
brics of paternalism are definable academically, they can be difficult
for the decision-maker to administer consistently on a case-by-case
basis. The resulting unpredictability produces unclear signals, and is
likely to foster insecurity in potential bargainers who contemplate fu-
ture agreements of a similar nature.
If parties to an agreement maintain a focus on the motivational
element of the contractual paradigm, they could discover that their
need for cumbersome and self-serving terms such as indemnity provi-
sions is minimal and could ultimately frustrate the overall goals which
drove them to seek the bargain initially. Moreover, the decision-
maker's recognition of the importance of the parties' motivation to
contract should prevent the premature invocation of paternalism to
145. While publishers want the indemnity provision, that provision's possible vulnera-
bility under paternalism could discourage publishers from entering into the agreement
altogether.
146. Opportunism generally refers to strategic conduct within the bargain which
manifests adverse consequences. See supra text accompanying note 94. However, the no-
tion should not be construed so narrowly. Strategic behavior which adheres to the tenets
of good faith and fair dealing may be acceptable and enforceable.
147. See infra note 183.
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resolve the parties' dispute in the event of a transactional breakdown.
If the motivation of both parties has been facilitated and sustained,
and their respective goals and ultimate expectations preserved in a
truly consensual agreement, they will perform their respective obliga-
tions without the need for intervention by a decision-maker. This fa-
cilitation of the parties' goals, expectations, and motivations will also
obviate the need for obtrusive clauses such as indemnity provisions.
Parties to bargains should particularly recognize the disutility of
including indemnity provisions in their agreements. These provisions
may ultimately frustrate the mutual goals and expectations of the par-
ties and stymie potential gains that could be realized from their
transaction.
2. Maintenance of Primary Motivational Goals with the Minimization of
Paternalism
Parties, such as writers and publishers, bargain with each other
because of primary motivations which encompass the optimization of
gain.14 8 This goal is related to the concept of profit maximization,
which connotes the parties' objective to maximize the financial gain of
their business enterprise.149 Of course, profit maximization may have
its limits, particularly if the parties garner such substantial review as to
diminish the utility of earning additional profits.' 50
Irrespective of their desire for pecuniary gain, an equally para-
mount object of the parties is to maintain their overall motivational
goal without impinging adversely upon third parties, thereby violating
public policy, and ensuring the voluntary nature of their bargain. In
the case of the writer and publisher (and, for that matter, all bargain-
ers in the marketplace) the preservation of positive, motivational
148. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
149. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, New Directions in Corporate Law-Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1477, 1484-85 (1993) (describing
profit maximization within the corporate sphere as "corporate actors [going] about their
duties solely in pursuit of stockholder profits" and representing the purpose of the corpo-
ration); see also Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1,
16 (1994) (noting that courts "could define sophisticated firms as those with consistently
large profits" and that the pursuit of profits or "profit maximization" defines corporate
rationality); Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 113, 119 (1991) (defining the corporate objective to be that of profit max-
imization). See also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
150. See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the
Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 119 (1993)
(noting the diminished marginal utility of money to a disabled person, given the "social
and attitudinal barriers that have diminished [that person's] uses of her money"). For ad-
ditional application of the diminished marginal utility concept, see Mark P. Gergen, The
Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1431-32 (1988).
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goals which precipitate their contract can best be accomplished by
minimizing interference from decision-makers. Such minimization
can only occur if the needs of paternalism are not apparent in the
parties' agreement.
Concomitant with the parties' goals and ultimate expectations to
maximize profits garnered from the writer's present work, a reason-
able outgrowth of the original bargain is the publisher's objective to
distribute future works of the writer in the event the present work is a
success. This goal, whether tacit or explicit, constitutes a logical out-
growth of the parties' desire to maximize profit and ensure continued
gain. Given the success of their original venture, it would be rational
to deduce that the parties, most particularly the publisher, would seek
to bargain for future works of the writer.
Indeed, publishers may explicitly provide for the dissemination of
the writer's future works, thereby expressing the desire to maintain a
business relationship with a potentially successful writer. The case of
In re Stein and Day Inc.'51 explicitly illustrates this manifestation. In
Stein, the writer sought to require a publisher in bankruptcy either to
assume or reject their publication contract as executory. 152 This ma-
neuver by the writer was an attempt to obtain royalties for a book
which the debtor-publisher had already distributed.'53 The court indi-
cated that a publishing contract between a writer and a debtor-pub-
lisher was executory only as to the debtor, and that the parties had a
valid publication agreement which included, inter alia, a warranty and
hold harmless provision, and also an option clause which granted to
the publisher the first opportunity to publish the writer's next work. 154
Under such a clause, the publisher was obligated to notify the writer
within six weeks of its intent to exercise its option, and the parties
were to agree upon terms governing the publication. 155
While the bankruptcy court in Stein did not explicitly address the
efficacy and legality of the warranties, hold harmless and option
clauses, it must be assumed that these clauses are valid under New
York law. This conclusion results from the court's finding that the
entire agreement, including the option clause and warranty and in-
demnity provisions, is binding to the extent that the debtor-publisher
maintains its obligation to pay royalties on books provided by the
151. 81 B.R. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
152. Id. at 264.
153. Id. at 265.
154. Id. at 265-67.
155. Id. at 266.
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writer.'56 The inclusion of such option clauses supports the premise
that the writer and publisher have, as an integral part of their bargain,
the goal of extending their relationship to market future works of the
author.
The presence of an indemnity provision in the parties' agreement
raises the possible need for scrutiny based upon paternalistic con-
cerns.157 Consequently, paternalistic intervention may be minimized
if the indemnity provision were eliminated from the parties' agree-
ment. The question then remains: If the indemnity provision were
eliminated, how would the publisher's concerns be accommodated?
The publisher must recognize that his motivation for the indem-
nity provision may be overstated given the realities of the situation. If
the provision were indeed enforced, the publisher would be involved
in any type of litigation involving the originality or authenticity of the
writer's work. The publisher also has far greater financial means to
guard against and defend such suits. Those resources ultimately
would be involved notwithstanding the presence of this agreement. 158
This is particularly true if the writer remains a novice or fledgling art-
ist with limited resources. 59
In the absence of an indemnity provision in the publication con-
tract, the publisher would likely become a party to any suit challeng-
ing the work of the writer.1 60 This is particularly true given the his
role as the disseminator of the work, together with his status as a
"deep pocket." As a joint tortfeasor, the publisher, unless he can per-
156. Id. at 267.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 101-107.
158. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Communications, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that the indemnification provision of songwriter's agreement would be construed
to refer only to attorney fees incurred by publisher in actions involving third parties and
not to those incurred in litigation between publisher and composer); McGinniss v. Employ-
ers Reinsurance Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1263, 1265-66, 1270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (illustrating,
albeit tacitly, that the publisher's resources in the form of its insurance will be involved in
suits relevant to the writer's work).
159. One cannot address the publisher's concern without an examination of the writer's
interest in the elimination of the indemnity provision. To appease the publisher, the writer
may allow the indemnity provision to remain in the contract in order to accomplish her
overall goal of getting her work published. Although she may be uncomfortable with the
indemnity provision, she may find relief in the idea that the provision may be unenforce-
able due to paternalistic concerns. However, given the unpredictability of paternalistic
intervention, the writer cannot comfortably rely on a court to alleviate any burden caused
by that provision. See supra text accompanying notes 145-147.
160. In many cases involving copyright infringement or some interference with owner-
ship rights, publishers, as well as authors are named as defendants. See Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc. 789
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Arica Institute,
Inc. v. Palmer, 770 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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suade the decision-maker that primary liability should fall upon the
writer, would be liable, to some extent, for any damages resulting
from a verdict against the defendants. Irrespective of the publisher's
lack of culpability, he will ultimately encounter litigation costs associ-
ated with defending such a lawsuit. Even if the author is proven to be
the primary tortfeasor, her resources to cover the resultant damages
are, in most instances, limited. Consequently, the publisher may be
liable for any balances that result. This realistic scenario underscores
the possible disutility of the indemnity provision.
As a result, the indemnity agreement, included because of the
publisher's more minor motivation regarding possible liability for dis-
tribution of the writer's work, may tend to frustrate the primary moti-
vation for the agreement-the dissemination of present and future
works of the writer and the expectant pecuniary rewards. The inclu-
sion of this provision may have a direct effect on the consciousness
and, ultimately, creativity of the writer.161 The knowledge of potential
liability would undoubtedly enter into her consciousness, particularly
in the composition of new works. The publisher and writer's agree-
ment tacitly includes the expectation that their bargain will spawn ad-
ditional creative works developed by the writer, yielding future
pecuniary gain for them both. Such creativity and prolificacy impacts
the parties' overall motivational goal to maximize gain.162 Notwith-
161. One may question the premise that an indemnity provision can intimidate the
writer. Given her lack of experience within the bargaining process, she may well disregard
or otherwise fail to appreciate the significance of her duty to indemnify the publisher in the
event of any type of lawsuit involving her work. See Weaver v. American Oil Company,
257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-47 (1971) (noting that lessee's contract was unconsciona-
ble given a number of factors including his lack of education and comprehension).
While new to the bargaining arena however, many writers, by nature of their trade
and training, may possess the ability to comprehend the significance of the indemnity pro-
vision. The very language of a typical indemnification clause is not convoluted or incom-
prehensible to someone of the writer's skill and acumen. See supra note 20 which provides
the text of a typical indemnity provision. A lack of appreciation of the clause may closely
relate to a failure to read the clause (and other provisions of the contract), rather than a
lack of comprehension. The law generally recognizes the bargainer's duty to read their
respective contract. See, e.g., Saavedra v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 & cmt. b, § 157 & cmt. b); Trinh v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 894 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Hart v. Vermont Inv. Ltd. Partner-
ship, 667 A.2d 578, 582 (D.C. 1995). Once the writer reads the provision, however, her
realization .of potential liability can be startling. See supra note 19 which depicts the
travails of a typical fledgling writer. Her demonstrated unsophistication or lack of knowl-
edge may portend the invocation of unconscionability as a mechanism to protect her. See
supra notes 115, 118-121.
162. Others acknowledge the desire of firms or companies to maximize profits. See
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 268 (1992) (stating that directors have a duty to "maximize profits of the firm
for the benefit of shareholders"); Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like Money In The Bank? An
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standing any plausible argument that the publisher may be in the best
position to guard against copyright infringements and defend against
law suits, 163 it remains in the best interest of all to omit the indemnity
clause, or at least modify it to lessen its impact upon the writer.164
B. Relational Theory: An Argument Which May Obviate Indemnity
Provisions
Given the uncertainty surrounding the application of paternalism
within the bargain, the justification for eliminating indemnity provi-
sions may lie in the recognition that the parties' respective motiva-
tions obviate the need for such onerous clauses. Relational theory,
which is very much attuned to parties' motivations to contract, pro-
Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties to Protect the S & L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 355, 362 (1992); Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern For Others In
the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Disillusion And Fiduciary Obligation
In Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 647 (1992); David Millon, Redefining Cor-
porate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate
Constituency: Asking The Wrong Question, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 425, 430 (1990); Oliver
Hart, An Economist's Perspective On The Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1758 (1989) (noting that neoclassical economic theory indicates that firms seek to maxi-
mize profits). But see Russell Korobkin, Policymaking, And The Offer/Asking Price Gap:
Toward A Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663,708 n.50 (1994)
(contrasting Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 1757, 1758 (1989), with ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 114 (1932) (noting that profit maximization may
become secondary to the goals of corporate managers); Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphys-
ics of Time:" A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 Bus. LAW. 377, 385 (1991) (also noting that a
company exists to make a profit, but it also exists for other purposes such as the provision
of goods and services, the creation of employment, and other goals which promote social
welfare); Glen Alan Graff, Targets Standing Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act: When
Your Antitrust Injury Hurts, Standing Can Be A Problem, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 219, 239
(1991) (stating that maximization of profits may not be the sole goal of corporate manag-
ers); see also supra note 149.
163. The publisher may be in the best position to defend such suits given his superior
resources.
164. One may question whether the indemnity provision truly frustrates the goal of the
writer and publisher to produce and distribute future, successful works. Such skepticism
flows from the premise that the publisher is more concerned with protecting his present
assets rather than developing a long term relationship with the writer. The publisher
would, therefore, require the writer to indemnify him from any potential liability resulting
from the publication of the writer's work. This point gains significance given the pub-
lisher's aversion to the risks associated with publishing the author's work. See supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text.
Yet the publisher's desire to protect what he has, i.e., the company's present assets
sans any profits gleaned from the fledgling writer's work, may be overshadowed by his
ultimate desire to maximize profits. Companies tend to perish or flourish depending upon
their success in accomplishing this latter goal. To ensure financial viability as well as share-
holder satisfaction, the publisher, as a corporate entity, would likely seek to generate as
much profit as feasible. Distribution of future, successful works of a promising writer
should further this goal of maximizing gain.
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vides substantiation for the elimination of various enforcement and
policing mechanisms within the bargaining process.
Generally, relational theorists concentrate on the motivation of
the parties themselves and the subject matter of their agreement as
indicators of the expected standard of performance.'65 While difficult
to define, relational contracts are best understood by the characteris-
tics they exhibit: incompleteness and duration. They tend to be some-
what incomplete; that is, the parties intentionally omit certain terms to
provide for exigencies which would affect the risk or risks associated
with the completed contract. Additionally, relational contracts for
either goods or services may extend over a period of time.166 The
incompleteness of the parties' agreement is not so much a result of a
failure to perfect the contract as it is related to the parties' inability to
delineate those terms in a cost-efficient manner. In effect, incom-
pleteness and duration are recognized as features which the bargain-
ers appreciate and freely assume.' 67
Typical examples of relational contracts include requirement con-
tracts, wherein X promises to supply all of the goods required by Y;
and output contracts, wherein Y promises to purchase all of the goods
produced by X. 168 Additionally, service contracts may also fall within
the relational umbrella. For example, X agrees to teach Y's math
165. See generally sources cited infra note 167.
166. See Allen Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271-73 (1992) (providing a descrip-
tive definition of relational contracts); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1111-26
(1981).
167. Relational contract theory constitutes a relatively recent development initially as-
sociated with Professor Ian MacNeil. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CON-
TRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil,
Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); Ian R. Macneil,
Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classi-
ficatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjust-
ment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, (1978); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Con-
tracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do
and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483 (1985). Other scholars also have participated in
the dialogue concerning relational contract theory. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational
Contract And Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 43 (1983); Richard Cras-
well, The Relational Move: Some Questions From Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTER-
DISCIPLINARY L.J. 91 (1993); Christian Joerges, Relational Contract Theory in a
Comparative Perspective: Tensions Between Contract and Antitrust Law Principles in the
Assessment of Contract Relations Between Automobile Manufacturers and Their Dealers in
Germany, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 581 (1985); Goetz & Scott, supra note 2.
168. For detailed explanations of requirements and output contracts, see Stacy A.
Silkworth, Quantity Variation in Open Quantity Contracts, 51 U. Prr. L. REV. 235, 237 n.23
(1990); Cheryl R. Guttenberg, Comment, And Then There Were None: Requirements Con-
tracts and the Buyer Who Does Not Buy, 64 WASH. L. REV. 871, 872 (1989).
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class for the three-week period that Y travels to Europe. Agreements
which provide for one party to exclusively market the goods of, or
represent, another party (also called exclusive dealings), are also asso-
ciated with relational theory. As such, agreements whereby a pub-
lisher promises to distribute the work of a writer fit within this
rubric.169 These publishing contracts tend to be relational given their
lack of specificity with regard to the quantity of services provided by
the publisher, as well as quality of performance by the parties in
general.
Traditional contractual rules are particularly ill-equipped to eval-
uate the quality of performance under such agreements. With regard
to exclusive dealing arrangements, the decision-maker may dictate
that the parties' performances must conform to a "best efforts" stan-
dard, that is, the parties must utilize their best efforts in the perform-
ance of their contract. 7 ' "Best efforts" appears to equate to the
notion of good faith.17' Although abstractly comprehensible, the
"best efforts" performance standard raises significant difficulties: How
does one define "best efforts?" How does one determine whether the
parties have performed in accordance with "best efforts"
requirements?
Relational scholars, as a general rule, encourage decision-makers
to concentrate on the norms of the parties' relationships in order to
establish whether they have performed properly. 172 As a conse-
quence, relational theorists would posit that "best efforts" signify that
the parties to the agreement would both perform at an optimal level,
since such mutual performance would maximize the gain of each indi-
vidual party.' 73 Simply stated, since the ultimate goals of the parties
would be accomplished only by the performance of their duties at the
highest level pursuant to the contract, relational theory would dictate
169. See Schwartz, supra note 166, at 301-04.
170. See generally Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
171. See ROBERT E. Scorr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 302
(2d ed. 1993), for contracts dealing in the sale of goods, the decision-maker may invoke the
performance standards indicated in U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) which imposes on merchants the
obligation to perform in accordance with "reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ings in the trade."
172. Professor Schwartz categorizes relational scholars into two groups: one group be-
lieves that decision-makers should identify norms which "transcend the relationship of the
parties" and thereby utilize rules which promote fairness. This is classified as an external
relational approach. By contrast, internal relational theorists look to the norms inherent in
the parties' relationship to derive the rules relative to performance. Schwartz, supra note
166, at 275. Under either approach, the decision-maker looks to the nature of the parties'
relationship to derive performance standards.
173. Professors Goetz and Scott refer to this argument as "optimal output" and "joint
maximization." Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1111-26.
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that the parties will perform at an optimal level to preserve their own
interests. This phenomenon has often been referred to as "joint max-
imization" '174 or "optimal output."' 75 As a result, the parties will be
assured that each would put forward its "best efforts" in the perform-
ance of their bargain.
To a certain extent, relational theory supports the thesis that in-
demnity provisions are necessary in bargains such as publishing con-
tracts. The viability of this argument requires two assumptions: first,
that the publishing contract, while not explicitly noting a continuing
relationship, could be considered "quasi-continuing" if one assumes
that the parties will continue to deal with one another as long as their
initial bargain is successful and mutually beneficial; and second, that
both parties, in recognition of the factors requiring their bargain to be
successful, will ensure that their subsequent performance will be "op-
timal," thereby maintaining the integrity of the bargain.
The first assumption can be plausibly demonstrated in the
writer's and publisher's bargain. Although the contract between the
writer and publisher covers only the transaction involving the writer's
present manuscript and therefore appears finite, there is a realistic ex-
pectation that success will prompt them to negotiate future agree-
ments for other works written by the writer. In this scenario, it is
helpful to think of the writer and publisher's contract as relational.176
One may go so far as to say that parties tacitly envision a continuation
of their business relationship pending the success of their initial ven-
ture. The fact that the initial contract is not explicitly continuing in
nature only goes to demonstrate the parties' unfamiliarity with one
another and the unproven nature of the writer's product. Yet it is
reasonable to assume that if the writer's manuscript is well-received
and original, resulting in significant gain for both parties, the writer
and publisher would likely bargain with each other again if the writer
authors a new manuscript.
Other factors also contribute to the continuation of their success-
ful relationship in that scenario. Notwithstanding the parties' satisfac-
174. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1240 n.45 (1994) ("Joint maximization means that the contracting surplus is maximized,
which in turn means that 'allocative efficiency' is achieved .... ").
175. See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72
IOWA L. REV. 577, 585 (1987) (stating that "[bly definition, society achieves economic
efficiency (optimal output] when it reaches a state in which no further re-distribution of
resources and goods can be made that will make one individual better off without making
another individual worse off.").
176. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1111-26 (defining a relational contract as an
"on-going contract for the supply of goods or services").
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tion with the gains produced from the original transaction, the
transaction and information costs associated with consummating new
bargains for future works by the writer should be minimized if the
parties continue to bargain with one another. While the publisher
may look for other writers to represent, she would certainly seek to
maintain a relationship with a successful writer who would likely gar-
ner more profit than a novice writer. Furthermore, the transaction
costs associated with bargaining with a different writer of equal caliber
would be higher than those associated with a continued bargain with
the initial writer. As a result, the parties would likely maintain a pro-
spective approach to their initial relationship. While the writer's and
publisher's agreement may not fit within the precise definition of a
relational contract, the realistic implication that the parties will likely
continue to bargain for future works by the writer would tend to make
the seemingly finite bargain relational in nature.
The second assumption, which focuses upon the parties' adher-
ence to optimal performance standards, tends to be more difficult, yet
ostensible. If the parties maintain the tacit expectation that they will
continue to deal with one another if their initial arrangement proves
profitable, then both parties should have the motivation at the forma-
tion of their bargain to operate at an optimal level during the per-
formance of their agreement. Under the relational theory of
contracts, mechanisms within the bargain should ensure that both par-
ties will work at a level which will maximize the gain of both parties.
Such an "optimal output" would signify that the publisher would per-
form at her best to maximize her own interests, while simultaneously
maximizing the interests of the writer. This self-motivating and polic-
ing mechanism of the parties' bargain may obviate, or at the least min-
imize, the need for paternalistic intervention by decision-makers. This
characteristic should please economists, who would likely agree that
enforcement mechanisms, whether judicial or legislative, which are
external to the bargaining process, may magnify the parties' transac-
tion costs and potentially inhibit the overall efficiency of the bar-
gain.'77 It would also eliminate the need for defining ambiguous
terms such as "good faith" and "best efforts" which the decision-
177. For an economic analysis of agreements which are considered "self-enforcing," see
generally Michinhiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 63 (1992); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalition in Medieval Trade, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Benjamin Klien & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Lester G. Telser, A Theory
of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980).
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maker often uses to determine whether paternalistic intervention is
necessary. 178
If the writer and publisher's contract can be considered rela-
tional, then the parties have a built-in mechanism to ensure that both
operate at optimal levels to preserve their potential future bargains.
The writer, if she has any aspirations for a continued writing career,
would not likely jeopardize the relationship with the publisher by pro-
viding unoriginal or plagiarized material. More importantly, the pub-
lisher should reconsider the inclusion of an indemnity provision,
which may hamper future bargains with a writer, especially since the
latter may become renowned and produce future works which may
garner significant gain. Clearly, the parties must articulate these moti-
vational goals at the negotiation stage of their bargain so as to en-
hance the probability that the parties will perform at their optimal
levels. It is conceded that the relational nature of such contracts func-
tions most effectively in the policing of the performance of the con-
tract subsequent to its formation. However, if relational theory
involves the parties' continuing relationship and the preservation of
that relationship, the concept of optimal output can also apply to the
contract between writers and publishers.
Joint maximization or optimal output does not signify that the
need for paternalism is obliterated. Instead, resorting to paternalistic
remedies should be made only on a default basis where: (a) the parties
fail to recognize and acknowledge their motivations as the genesis of
their transaction and, as a result, joint maximization or optimal output
does not operate to ensure the protection of each party's bargain; or
(b) where the parties, in reliance on joint maximization, eliminate
risk-shifting clauses such as indemnity agreements, and opportunism
frustrates the goals and expectations of one or more of the parties.
When either of these two conditions occurs, the parties remain free to
resort to the decision-maker, who may utilize the checks of paternal-
ism to maintain the integrity of their bargain.
Admittedly, the use of relational theory to justify the exclusion of
the indemnity provision has weaknesses. First, the parties may intend
that their arrangement remain limited to the one manuscript that is
the subject matter of the contract. This intent may reflect the parties'
(particularly the writer's) motivational goal and expectation to main-
tain the freedom to bargain with others regardless of the success of
their initial venture. Additionally, the applicability of relational the-
ory to this contract presupposes that writers would not risk the prof-
178. See supra text accompanying notes 170-175.
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fering of unoriginal or plagiarized material. While there could be
unscrupulous writers who are willing to risk the consequences of offer-
ing plagiarized material, the probability of such opportunistic conduct
should be low given the consequences the writer would incur for such
conduct. Yet, it cannot be denied that some authors may be willing to
assume such risks. Regardless of the debate regarding these assump-
tions, it seems clear that relational theory as an evaluative tool is, at
the very least, probative of the possible obviation of indemnity provi-
sions within the publishing contract.
C. The Case for a "Kinder, Gentler" Indemnity Provision
Notwithstanding the arguments that the parties should volunta-
rily eliminate indemnity provisions from their contracts, factors re-
main which militate against such action. Given the fact that indemnity
provisions are per se enforceable, 79 parties, particularly publishers,
may be inclined to include such provisions. In that regard, the pub-
lisher may prefer to risk the decision-maker's paternalistic interven-
tion rather than accept the risks associated with a fledgling writer
whose work may not be original. The publisher may also feel inclined
to include the indemnity provision given the unpredictability of pater-
nalistic intervention by the decision-maker. Buttressing this desire is
the reality that indemnity provisions within these contracts tend to be
rather commonplace in the trade.180 Most importantly, the publisher's
degree of risk aversion may overshadow his concerns relative to the
maintenance or preservation of the integrity of their basic bargain,
i.e., originality, prolificacy, and continuity.
In recognition of such reticence, a plausible compromise might be
to restructure the standard indemnity provision to allow the writer
some degree of control or involvement in the proceedings if a liability
action arises which triggers the invocation of that clause.181 The
179. See supra text accompanying note 102.
180. See supra note 20.
181. A modified indemnity clause which is less for parties such as fledgling writers may
include the following language:
(a) Author represents and warrants that: (i) She is the sole Author of the Work;
now owns all rights in it granted hereunder, free of liens or encumbrances; and
has the complete authority to execute this Agreement; (ii) The Work is original
and has not been published [unless it has been previously published; prior publi-
cation should be duly noted and explicitly excepted]; (iii) The Work does not
infringe statutory copyrights or common law literary rights of others, and, to Au-
thor's knowledge, neither violates the rights of privacy of other persons, nor is
libelous in any manner.
(b) (i) Author agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Publisher, with regard to
any reprint or subsequent editions of the Work licensed by Publisher pursuant to
the Agreement, against any final judgment for damages (after all appeals) against
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writer's interest in this potential litigation clearly substantiates her
right to inclusion in, and a degree of control of, this matter. Control
need not be exclusive for the writer.182 Yet such involvement and
shared control should minimize the writer's ultimate costs by ensuring
that decisions in the litigation would reflect her interests as well as
those of the publisher. This compromise provision still places primary
liability upon the writer, thereby satisfying the publisher's aversion to
risk. While the compromise does not alleviate the ultimate pecuniary
burden placed upon the writer, it should, at a minimum, provide her
the opportunity to protect her own interests through participation in
the strategic decisions of this litigation.
Another option which may minimize risks associated with the
traditional, "writer assumes all liability" agreement might be a provi-
sion which commands the parties to indemnify each other for damages
resulting from their respective conduct. 183 Commonly referred to as
them in any action arising out of facts which constitute a breach of the foregoing
warranties and costs and attorneys' fees incurred by them in defending an action
in which such judgment is recovered, provided that Author's liability hereunder is
limited to [figure to be mutually agreed upon]% of the sums payable to Author
under this agreement or $[figure to be mutually agreed upon], whichever is less.
(ii) This indemnity shall not apply to any material inserted in Author's Work pur-
suant to Publisher's instructions, or to actionable material which Publisher should
have known was actionable as noted in (a)(ii).
(c) (i) Publisher shall give Author immediate notice of any suit brought against
Publisher or its licensees alleging facts which, if proven, would constitute a breach
of the warranties in Subparagraph (a). Author may, if she chooses, defend such
suit with counsel of her own choosing, at her own expense; provided that if she
does so, Publisher may nonetheless participate in the defense with counsel of its
choosing and at its own expense. Publisher shall not settle any claim, demand,
action or proceeding without Author's consent. (ii) If Author shall defend such
suit, she shall not be responsible for Publisher's attorneys' fees or costs, except as
required in Subparagraph (b) above. (iii) If suit is brought, Publisher may hold
in escrow, in an interest-bearing account, Up to [figure to be mutually agreed
upon]% of each of the next three payments due under [payment provision in
publishing contract] until after the suit is terminated, or until [five years-subject
to negotiation] after its commencement, whichever occurs first; but in no event
shall the amount withheld exceed the amount of damages claimed in the
complaint.
182. Indeed, the publisher would want to maintain a degree of control over the litiga-
tion given her own interest in that matter.
183. Several factors, however, may militate against the writer assuming sole responsibil-
ity for the risks associated with the dissemination of her work. From a cost standpoint, she
may be able to avoid this risk at a lower cost than the publisher if her total compensation
package is higher in consideration of her assumption of this risk. However, in realistic
terms, the fledgling writer is most likely to receive lower compensation for her first work
given her status as a neophyte in this bargaining arena. It is likely that the publisher would
not be motivated to provide substantial compensation to a new writer whose popularity is
unproven. Additionally, irrespective of her ability to avoid the risk of a lawsuit involving
her work, instigation of such a suit would more likely include the publisher given the lat-
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mutual indemnification agreements, they allocate liability to each
party individually.1" Given the conceptual reality that each party
bears responsibility for their own breaches of conduct, these provi-
sions discourage recklessness and, therefore, would not contravene
public policy notions. Consequently, decision-makers may view these
clauses more favorably.!85
In the case of the writer and publisher, a mutual indemnification
clause would signify that each party would ultimately be liable for its
own conduct in the bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the writer
would be liable for damages resulting from her negligence, while the
publisher would maintain liability for his negligent acts. Although this
arrangement fails to alleviate the residual concerns emanating from
the one-sided indemnity agreement which dictates the author's liabil-
ter's substantial resources or perception of having "deep pockets." Irrespective of precau-
tions taken by the writer, litigation, particularly that with regard to copyright infringement,
may ensue and include the publisher as a joint tortfeasor. See supra note 160 and accom-
panying text. Regardless of the writer's vigilance, any resultant lawsuit would include the
publisher who must expend resources to, at a minimum, defend his respective position.
Although the indemnity provision would in theory place the responsibility for damages on
the writer, her limited resources may, in the long term, leave the publisher liable for any
balances which the writer cannot cover. This would be particularly true for a fledgling
writer who most likely does not have the resources to cover extensive damages from such
lawsuits. Instead of placing confidence in an indemnity provision which provides marginal
protection at best, the publisher would be better off if he used his resources to confirm the
authenticity of the writer's work. Publishers systematically scrutinize authors' works in
order to determine their marketability. Instead of placing confidence in an indemnity pro-
vision designed to protect the publisher from financial liability in the event of lawsuit, he
would be better off in utilizing his vast informational resources to ensure that the author's
work is original as well as marketable. Given the fact that the publisher would only pub-
lish those works which are within its expertise as well as "market," he should maintain the
resources to project with reasonable certainty whether the author's work is original and,
therefore, less subject to legal attack.
184. See, e.g., Clark Equip. Co. v. Dial Corp., 25 F.3d 1384, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) (identi-
fying the mutual indemnification provision in a contract for purchase of assets of a com-
pany's subsidiary which manufactured construction cranes); Central Buffalo Project Corp.
v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 890,891 (App. Div. 1994) (noting the assignment
of a commercial lease included mutual indemnification provisions wherein the assignor and
assignee each agreed to indemnify the other for a breach of the assignment or other terms
of the lease); Silverman v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (App. Div. 1982)
(construing the real estate "brokers"' agreement which contained a mutual indemnification
provision leaving each party responsible for her own liabilities); see also Batchkowsky v.
Penn Cent. Co., 525 F.2d 1121, 1123 (2d Cir. 1975).
185. Research fails to reveal cases which find mutual indemnification clauses to be inva-
lid per se. Yet, this does not indicate that these provisions face less scrutiny or are more
favored than conventional, one-sided arrangements. It is likely that mutual indemnifica-
tions encounter scrutiny similar to that given to conventional indemnity agreements. See
cases cited supra note 184.
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ity, it does note a degree of reciprocity which facially connotes both
parties' responsibility for their reasonable conduct.' 86
The inclusion of mutual indemnification language does not com-
prise a panacea for the writer. In fact, it functions more as a placebo
rather than a cure for the problems created by the publisher's indem-
nity agreement. The writer would continue to face potentially signifi-
cant liability in the event of activation of the indemnity provision
wherein she agrees to protect the publisher from her (the writer's)
activity. Moreover, the likelihood of publisher liability under his (the
publisher's) provision appears slim, given his limited function in the
bargain, i.e., distribution of the writer's work. Indeed, the problems of
disparity of bargaining position'87 and the possible chilling effect upon
the writer's creativity remain.
However, such mutuality impresses upon the parties (particularly
the writer) the magnitude of their respective responsibilities, and dis-
pels, at least objectively, the lopsidedness of obligation. These provi-
sions may also appease decision-makers whose concerns relating to
"one-sided" indemnification agreements focus upon the encourage-
ment of reckless conduct on the part of the indemnitee (the pub-
lisher). With mutual indemnification, there is a symbiotic allocation
of responsibility, thereby keeping reckless behavior in check. Yet, the
effectiveness of mutual indemnification may be dubious, since the
publisher (the more powerful party in the relationship) may nonethe-
less shift significant liability to the writer (the weaker party).
Of course, this "kinder, gentler" indemnity provision will not
serve the writer unless she specifically asks for it. One may posit that
a nalve or unsophisticated writer may fail to bargain for this modified
186. A mutual indemnity clause might include the following language:
a. Publisher shall indemnify and hold harmless Writer from and against any and
all loss, cost, liability, damage, and expense occasioned by or in connection with
any claim, demand, suit, proceeding, action, or cause of action asserted by any
other person, firm, or corporation, relating to the violation or infringement of the
rights of such other person, firm, or corporation in connection with the use of any
material furnished to Writer by Publisher or the breach by Publisher of any of the
provisions of this Agreement.
b. Writer shall indemnify and hold harmless Publisher, its employees, officers,
directors, stockholders, and agents, and other persons and corporations with
whom Company may enter into contracts for Writer's services, against any and all
loss, cost and liability occasioned by or in connection with any claim, demand, suit
proceeding, motion, or cause of action asserted or instituted by any other person,
firm, or corporation, relating to the violation or infringement of rights of such
other person, firm, or corporation, arising out of or in connection with Writer's
work contemplated hereunder, or the breach by Artist of any of the provisions of
this Agreement.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 131-134.
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clause with the publisher. Yet such naivete exists in a number of bar-
gaining situations not unique to that of the writer and publisher.
Many consumers fail to understand their right to negotiate the modifi-
cation of certain clauses in preformed contracts which were drafted by
the other party.18 8 Given the magnitude of the transaction and the
writer's particular abilities and talents, she should, however, be aware
of the significance of these clauses if not her ability to bargain against
them. Moreover, her lack of sophistication may underscore the pub-
lisher's duty to notify her of the seriousness of the transaction as well
as clauses such as the indemnity provision which will potentially sub-
ject her to extensive liability.1 89
One may question the degree of control that the publisher would
cede away to the writer in the event of litigation regarding the writer's
work. Since the writer may be jointly (or individually) liable for any
type of litigation therein, 90 she maintains a right to minimal involve-
ment, i.e., notice, within the framework of the litigation. The bargain-
ing position should be relatively straightforward-if the publisher and
writer share responsibility for damages resulting from the publication
of the writer's work, then the writer has a right to notice and some
voice in the defense of a resultant lawsuit.
IV
Conclusion
Contract rules, and the resultant terms they influence, should fa-
cilitate parties' bargains, thereby ensuring that the object of those bar-
gains remains intact. In the abstract, while given contract rules may
appear functional, when implemented, they may prove unpredictable
and counterproductive to the interests of the parties. Illustrative of
this factor are indemnity provisions contained in publishing contracts.
These provisions may satisfy a certain goal of one party to the agree-
ment, e.g., the publisher's desire for protection against any resultant
lawsuit, yet operate to frustrate prospective, more fundamental goals
and expectations, such as creativity, prolificacy, and continuity of the
bargaining relationship.
188. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 161. The writer should also seek advice from organizations such as
the Author's Guild, Inc. which serves to counsel writers in their transactions with publish-
ers. Ultimately, fledgling writers must take a certain degree of responsibility to educate
themselves regarding the obligations that flow from their potential bargains with
publishers.
190. See supra note 160.
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Decision-makers, while they should recognize the limitation of
contract rules and the effects these have on the parties' bargain, often
fail to respond to these idiosyncratic manifestations. This may be due
in part to the scope of their jurisdiction; they must devise rules that
are applicable to a variety of transactions and which, therefore, must
have a certain fungibility to maximize their utility in many trades.
Thus, parties must be vigilant to ensure that their blanket employment
of, and dependence upon, these rules do not lead to the implementa-
tion of dysfunctional contractual terms. Bargainers, regardless of the
subject matter of their bargain, must remain cognizant of the effect
that these rules and the terms which they generate have on their bar-
gain. They must, therefore, adjust or even eliminate those terms to
suit their overall motivational goals and expectations. Recognition of
the effects that contract rules and resultant terms such as indemnity
provisions have on their respective goals will lead to the ultimate
achievement of their expectations and, perhaps most importantly, to
the minimization of decision-maker intervention.
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